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it also enters the realm of politics, and is inevitably refashioned to serve the goals of politi-
cal argument. This happened starkly with the ECMH. It was subject to its own bubble – as 
a result of politics, it expanded from a narrow but important academic theory about the 
informational underpinnings of market prices to a broad ideological preference for market 
outcomes over even measured regulation. In this Article we examine the Subprime Crisis 
as a vehicle to return the ECMH to its information cost roots that support a more modest 
but sensible regulatory policy. In particular, we argue that the ECMH addresses informa-
tional efficiency, which is a relative, not an absolute measure. This focus on informational 
efficiency leads to a more focused understanding of what went wrong in 2007-2008. Yet 
informational efficiency is related to fundamental efficiency – if all information relevant 
to determining a security’s fundamental value is publicly available and the mechanisms 
by which that information comes to be reflected in the securities market price operate 
without friction, fundamental and informational efficiency coincide. But where all value-
relevant information is not publicly available and/or the mechanisms of market efficiency 
operate with frictions, the coincidence is an empirical question both as to the informa-
tion efficiency of prices and their relation to fundamental value. Properly framing market 
efficiency focuses our attention on the frictions that drive a wedge between relative effi-
ciency and efficiency under perfect market conditions. So framed, relative efficiency is 
a diagnostic tool that identifies the information costs and structural barriers that reduce 
price efficiency which, in turn, provides part of a realistic regulatory strategy. While it will 
not prevent future crises, improving the mechanisms of market efficiency will make prices 
more efficient, frictions more transparent, and the influence of politics on public agencies 
more observable, which may allow us to catch the next problem earlier. Recall that on 
September 8, 2008, the Congressional Budget Office publicly stated its uncertainty about 
whether there would be a recession and predicted 1.5 percent growth in 2009. Eight days 
later, Lehman Brothers had failed, and AIG was being nationalized.
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Abstract 
 
Compared to the worldwide financial carnage that followed the Subprime Crisis 
of 2007-2008, it may seem of small consequence that it is also said to have demonstrated 
the bankruptcy of an academic financial institution: the Efficient Capital Market 
Hypothesis (“ECMH”).  Two things make this encounter between theory and seemingly 
inconvenient facts of consequence.  First, the ECMH had moved beyond academia, 
fueling decades of a deregulatory agenda.  Second, when economic theory moves from 
academics to policy, it also enters the realm of politics, and is inevitably refashioned to 
serve the goals of political argument.  This happened starkly with the ECMH.  It was 
subject to its own bubble – as a result of politics, it expanded from a narrow but 
important academic theory about the informational underpinnings of market prices to a 
broad ideological preference for market outcomes over even measured regulation.  In this 
Article we examine the Subprime Crisis as a vehicle to return the ECMH to its 
information cost roots that support a more modest but sensible regulatory policy.  In 
particular, we argue that the ECMH addresses informational efficiency, which is a 
relative, not an absolute measure.  This focus on informational efficiency leads to a more 
focused understanding of what went wrong in 2007-2008.  Yet informational efficiency is 
related to fundamental efficiency – if all information relevant to determining a security’s 
fundamental value is publicly available and the mechanisms by which that information 
comes to be reflected in the securities market price operate without friction, fundamental 
and informational efficiency coincide.  But where all value-relevant information is not 
publicly available and/or the mechanisms of market efficiency operate with frictions, the 
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coincidence is an empirical question both as to the information efficiency of prices and 
their relation to fundamental value.   
 Properly framing market efficiency focuses our attention on the frictions that 
drive a wedge between relative efficiency and efficiency under perfect market conditions.  
So framed, relative efficiency is a diagnostic tool that identifies the information costs and 
structural barriers that reduce price efficiency which, in turn, provides part of a realistic 
regulatory strategy.  While it will not prevent future crises, improving the mechanisms of 
market efficiency will make prices more efficient, frictions more transparent, and the 
influence of politics on public agencies more observable, which may allow us to catch the 
next problem earlier.  Recall that on September 8, 2008, the Congressional Budget Office 
publicly stated its uncertainty about whether there would be a recession and predicted 1.5 
percent growth in 2009.  Eight days later, Lehman Brothers had failed, and AIG was 
being nationalized. 
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 Contrary to the views of many commentators, the Efficient Capital Market 
Hypothesis (“ECMH”), as originally framed in financial economics, was not “disproven” 
by the Subprime Crisis of 2007-2008, nor has it been shown to be irrelevant to the project 
of regulatory reform of financial markets.  To the contrary, the ECMH points to 
commonsense reforms in the wake of the Crisis, some of which have already been 
adopted.   
 The Crisis created a lot of losers—from individual investors to pension funds and 
German Landesbanken—who purchased mortgage-backed securities that they did not and 
perhaps could not understand, and it cost them extraordinary amounts of money as a 
result.  Perhaps more significantly, the knock-on effects of the Subprime Crisis rippled 
through the finance markets, pushed Lehman Brothers over the edge, decimated other 
financial institutions across the world, and resulted in massive provisions of government 
assistance and sometimes the full nationalization or failure of financial institutions and 
even giant industrial enterprises such as General Motors and Chrysler.  Moreover, the 
damaging consequences of the Subprime Crisis continue.  America’s recovery is fragile. 
The Great Recession of 2008 to 2010 is also the backdrop for Europe’s sovereign debt 
and banking crisis that still lingers today.  Some smaller European nations—including 
Greece, Iceland, Ireland, and Portugal—required large international aid packages, and 
even larger countries such as Italy and Spain were at risk of default prior to decisive 
intervention by the European Central Bank.  The resulting pressure to slash government 
spending threatens political stability across Europe.  The recent political Sturm und 
Drang in the United States over budget deficits and debt limits reflects similar sharply-
divided views about the causes and policy implication of the Crisis.    
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Against this backdrop, one might think it of small consequence that the Subprime 
Crisis is also said to have dealt major setbacks to academic theories, most particularly the 
ECMH.1  After all, the only loss that follows a crisis in theory—as opposed to a 
debilitating crisis in the economy—is damage to the egos of the academics who defend or 
reject a contested theory.  Indeed, academic theories (unlike economies) thrive on 
contradiction to make advances, a point famously stressed by Thomas Kuhn almost fifty 
years ago.2 
Nevertheless, the particular iteration of theory and response attending the ECMH 
after the Subprime Crisis differs importantly from other encounters between theory and 
seemingly inconvenient facts.  The reason is that beginning in the 1970s the ECMH 
moved beyond the academic community, and has played a prominent role in the larger 
world political debate and regulatory reform ever since.  One or another interpretation of 
the ECMH has influenced regulatory policy for well over thirty years.3 As a result, the 
public understanding of the limits of the ECMH is not just a matter of academic debate; it 
                                                
 
1 Macroeconomic theory has also suffered a reputation loss.  As Robert Hall has pointed out, neoclassical 
macroeconomics does not explain why drops in output and employment persist for significant periods after 
a financial crisis is resolved.  Robert E. Hall, Why Does the Economy Fall to Pieces after a Financial 
Crisis?, 24 J. Econ. Persp. 3, 7 (2010).  Hall argues that the persistence is caused by an increase in financial 
frictions, particularly information costs, that survive for significant periods after the immediate crisis is 
resolved.  Id.; Robert E. Hall, The High Sensitivity of Economic Activity to Financial Frictions, 121 Econ. 
J. 351, 351, 353 (2011).  As we develop in Part III, a similar phenomenon exists with respect to market 
efficiency.  Edward G. Fox, Merritt B. Fox & Ronald J. Gilson, Economic Crisis and Share Price 
Unpredictability: Reasons and Implications 1–8 (Mar. 28, 2013) (unpublished manuscript) (available at 
http://www.law.colombia.edu/faculty/fac_resources/faculty_lunch/spring2013), argue that crisis-related 
changes in information costs also explain another financial crisis-related phenomenon: the increase in 
unsystematic risk in stock prices that has accompanied every financial crisis since the early 20th century. 
2 Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions 6 (1962).  
3 These range from SEC rules allowing corporations to incorporate by reference information contained in 
already-filed documents into short form registration statements, to the Supreme Court´s decision in Basic 
Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 247 (1988), which by allowing reliance to be presumed in a securities fraud 
class action if the plaintiffs show that the relevant market was efficient, provides the doctrinal foundation 
that makes securities class actions economically feasible.  See note 5 infra.  
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carries real political consequences. Important regulatory implications follow if the 
ECMH itself is held partially responsible for the Subprime Crisis.4  
Thus, the rise and fall of the ECMH is as much a political story as a story about a 
contested academic theory.  A theory that enters the realm of politics is inevitably 
refashioned by political actors to serve political ends.  The ECMH was hijacked by a 
powerful political clientele during the Reagan era if not before and was transformed, at 
least in the eyes of the public, from a narrow but important academic theory about the 
informational underpinnings of market prices into a broad ideological justification for 
preferring market outcomes over regulation.  In this sense, the ECMH was itself the 
subject of an artificial bubble.  It was inflated to provide a scientific justification for 
claims about the accuracy and meaning of market prices that were much more far-
reaching than it could support.  Now that these claims no longer seem plausible, the 
bubble has burst and the credibility of the ECMH has plummeted.  The danger today, in 
our view, is that academics and regulators may overreact to the prior overstatement of the 
implications of the ECMH by deregulatory partisans, and in so doing overlook the 
valuable policy insights that an appropriately “sized” ECMH can provide.5  It follows that 
                                                
 
4 See, e.g., George A. Akerlof & Robert J. Shiller, Animal Spirits: How Human Psychology Drives the 
Economy, and Why It Matters for Global Capitalism 1–3 (2009); John Cassidy, How Markets Fail: The 
Logic of Economic Calamities 3–14 (2009); Justin Fox, The Myth of the Rational Market: A History of 
Risk, Reward, and Delusion on Wall Street xi–xvi (2009); Dan Awrey, Complexity, Innovation and the 
Regulation of Modern Financial Markets 1–6 (Sept. 1, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1916649). 
5 The continuing status of the fraud on the market doctrine under Basic is a good example.  That doctrine 
makes a securities fraud class action economically feasible by dispensing with individual proof of reliance 
where the security in question is traded in an efficient market.  See, e.g., Basic, 485 U.S. at 247.  The idea 
is that an efficient market incorporates a misstatement or omission into the security’s price, and traders can 
be presumed to rely on that price.  Proof of an efficient market is therefore a condition to the certification of 
a plaintiffs class.  See, e.g., id.  A fair reading of the opinions in Amgen, Inc. v. Connecticut Retirement 
Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1196–97 (2013), decided after the Subprime Crisis and holding that 
a plaintiff was not required to prove the materiality of a misstatement or omission at the time of class 
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the ECMH must be returned to its original dimensions to preserve its narrower but still 
important intellectual value for regulators and policymakers.    
In Part I, we explain how the slippery notion of “fundamental efficiency” first 
inflated the ECMH into a brief for the broad deregulation of the markets, and is now 
deployed by critics to demonstrate that the ECMH is empirically and theoretically wrong.  
In the first case, the ECMH was badly overstated by assuming the convergence of 
informational and fundamental efficiency; in the second, the ECMH is badly understated 
by the claim that the potential divergence between informational and fundamental 
efficiency deprives the ECMH of any significance for regulatory policy.  As we describe 
below, fundamental efficiency means that investors get the correct price when they 
purchase securities in competitive financial markets—the discounted present value of 
expected cash flows associated with a security.  Informational efficiency means only that 
stock prices respond quickly to the release of new pubic information.  The difference is 
inherent in testing whether an efficient market price is also fundamentally efficient.  In 
perfect markets—one in which all information relevant to determining a security’s 
fundamental value is publicly available and the mechanisms by which that information 
                                                                                                                                            
 
certification, is that there were four votes to grant certiorari to reconsider Basic.  It is also a fair concern 
that at least part of the motivation is a misunderstanding of market efficiency.  See id. at 1204 (Alito, J., 
concurring) (“I join the opinion of the Court with the understanding that the petitioners did not ask us to 
revisit Basic’s fraud-on-the-market presumption.  As the dissent observes, more recent evidence suggests 
that the presumption may rest on a faulty economic premise.  In light of this development, reconsideration 
of the Basic presumption may be appropriate.”) (internal citations omitted); id. at 1206 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (“Today’s holding does not merely accept what some consider the regrettable consequences of 
the four-Justice opinion in Basic . . . .”); id. at 1208 n.4 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“The Basic decision is 
itself questionable. . . . [T]he Court has not been asked to revisit Basic’s fraud-on-the-market presumption. 
I thus limit my dissent to demonstrating that the Court is not following Basic’s dictates. Moreover, the 
Court acknowledges there is disagreement as to whether market efficiency is a binary, yes or no question, 
or instead operates differently depending on the information at issue . . . .” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)).  Not surprisingly, the Court has now granted certiorari with respect to the question of whether 
Basic should be overruled.  Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 718 F.3d 423 (5th Cir. 2013), cert 
granted, 134 S.Ct. 636 (2013).  
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comes to be reflected in the securities market price operate without friction, fundamental 
and informational efficiency coincide.6  But where all value-relevant information is not 
publicly available and/or the mechanisms of market efficiency operate with frictions, the 
coincidence is an empirical question both as to the information efficiency of prices and 
their relation to fundamental value.  Answering that empirical question thus requires a 
yardstick—an observable measure of fundamental value against which the market price 
can be compared.  And here the problem arises: market prices are observable and 
fundamental value is not.   
We argue in this Article that informational efficiency and fundamental efficiency 
are related; even if we cannot observe fundamental efficiency, we can with confidence 
predict that making prices more informationally efficient will move them in the direction 
of fundamental efficiency.  But there is no single yardstick of fundamental value against 
which market prices can be compared.  This point is made most clearly by reference to a 
famous quip by American comedian Henny Youngman.  When asked by an acquaintance, 
“How’s your wife?” Youngman replied without hesitation, “Compared to what?”7  In the 
end, the regulatory choice always comes down to comparing the accuracy of the market’s 
                                                
 
6 Despite the availability of all value relevant information and the frictionless operation of the mechanisms 
that cause that information to be reflected in securities prices, one can still imagine that prices will not be 
fundamentally efficient.  This would be because the market applies the wrong asset-pricing model to that 
information as a result of behavioral biases.  See Economic Sciences Prize Committee of the Royal 
Academy of Sciences, Understanding Asset Prices: Scientific Background on the Sveriges Ritksbank Prize 
in Economic Science in Memory of Alfred Nobel 2013, Oct. 14, 2013, available at 
http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-sciences/laureates/2013/advanced-
economicsciences2013.pdf  (“Nobel Prize Committee Report”)(surveying behavior explanations for asset 
pricing).  Note, however, that there may be no clear line between a market that employs the wrong model 
and an observer's misunderstanding of what investors do value--that is, the market model may be right and 
we simply fail to understand investors' utility function. 
7 Gregory Bateson & Henny Youngman, The Review of Arts, Literature, Philosophy, and the Humanities, 
http://www.ralphmag.org/FI/why.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2013). 
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valuation at a point in time with another yardstick of fundamental value calculated at the 
same moment in time.  Nevertheless, we argue throughout this Article and most 
conspicuously in Part I, that informationally efficient market prices are related to 
fundamental values through the availability of value-relevant information and market 
mechanisms that cause that information to be reflected in securities prices.  For policy 
purposes, increasing informational efficiency pushes market price in the direction of 
fundamental value, even if fundamental value is not observable, and so supports the 
policy agenda we set out in Part IV.  (Indeed, we believe this to be a consensus view 
among prominent critics of the ECMH even if it is seldom stated.)8  
Part II locates the ECMH historically as the common element in the foundational 
theories of modern finance and briefly reprises our own prior efforts to assess the effects 
of market frictions on informational efficiency.  The foundational theories of financial 
economics—including the Miller-Modigliani Irrelevance Propositions and the Capital 
Asset Pricing Model—are rooted in the assumption that nothing matters in perfect 
markets because costless arbitrage eliminates mispricing and penalizes bad financial 
strategies.  A perfect market is one in which prices are fundamentally and informationally 
efficient.  But such a market is just a helpful construct, a useful platform from which to 
begin the investigation of real markets with numerous frictions (or imperfections) ranging 
from imperfect information to agency costs and defective market structures.  
Investigation of how these frictions affect securities prices has generated a vast literature 
                                                
 
8 See, e.g., Gene D’Avolio, Efi Gildor, and Andrei Shleifer, Technology, Information Production and 
Market Efficiency, working paper presented to the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City (Sept. 18, 2001 
draft) at p. 1, available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=286597 (the authors are market efficiency 
skeptics who nonetheless advocate strong efforts to increase the informational efficiency of market prices). 
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in financial economics and a smaller but still considerable legal literature devoted to 
market regulation.  Our particular contribution to this literature has been to show that the 
informational efficiency of market prices must be understood as relative rather than 
absolute, i.e., that prices respond to new information more or less rapidly rather than 
instantly or not at all.  The speed with which prices reflect a particular “bit” of new 
information depends on the cost characteristics of the information and the transaction 
costs of trading on it.  Therefore, the ECMH should be understood as a theory about the 
relative informational efficiency of market prices, which is inherently a context specific 
inquiry. 9 
Part III of this paper assesses the Subprime Crisis in light of a properly framed 
ECMH—that is, one that conceives of the market’s relative informational efficiency as a 
function of the level of market frictions with respect to both the availability of value 
relevant information and the mechanisms through which that information is reflected in 
prices.  We stress here that information of great relevance to pricing some of the 
instruments associated with the Subprime Crisis was very costly—too costly, in fact, to 
enter into the pricing of these instruments.  In addition, market structure generally made 
trading on information about these securities costly or impossible (because over most of 
the relevant period there was no secondary market at all).  In such a setting, the ECMH 
predicts that markets will be relatively less efficient, as in fact they were. We also review 
                                                
 
9 Thus, in our view, Basic has always been wrong in framing the standard for a presumption of reliance as 
whether the market was efficient – that is, a question that could be answered yes or no.  Market efficiency 
is a continuum, not a single condition.  See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, The Mechanisms of 
Market Efficiency, 70 Va. L. Rev. 549 (1984).  Rather, the proper standard for the presumption is whether 
a misstatement affected the price of the stock at issue.  For an argument that the Supreme Court should 
adopt this position in its reconsideration of Basic, see Lucian A. Bebchuk & Allen Ferrell, Rethinking 
Basic (working paper, Dec. 2013), available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2371304 
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explanations of a less technical matter: why did sophisticated investors purchase these 
instruments of limited liquidity that they could not price?  Of the various explanations to 
be found in the Crisis literature, we argue that the most persuasive are those that turn on 
rational but wrong beliefs about the U.S. residential housing market (i.e., high 
information costs for all market participants including the regulators) and the poorly-
aligned incentives of key market intermediaries, including the major investment banks 
and the rating agencies.  Alternative explanations that invoke “cognitive bias” to explain 
the behavior of institutional investors and, hence, the divergence between observed and 
fundamental value, are less persuasive.10 
Finally, we turn in Part IV to an assessment of whether an appropriately sized 
ECMH has policy lessons for regulators in a post-Crisis world.  As noted above, we 
argue throughout this Article that while the informational efficiency of prices is related to 
the fundamental values of securities, the ECMH standing alone cannot definitively 
determine whether securities are mispriced relative to their fundamental value because 
fundamental value is not observable.11  However, making prices more informationally 
efficient will move them in the direction of fundamental efficiency.  In this Part, we 
illustrate how regulators can use the ECMH to enhance the informationally efficiency of 
prices, and thereby push prices toward the theoretical (and aspirational) fundamental 
                                                
 
10 Psychology may play a much larger role in assessing the behavior of homebuyers in the sub-prime and 
alt-prime markets.  See, e.g., Oren Bar-Gill, The Law, Economics and Psychology of Subprime Mortgage 
Contracts, 94 Cornell L. Rev. 1073, 1119 (2009).  However, the less likely it is that a borrower would be 
able to make her mortgage payments after the teaser rates expired on a no-down-payment loan, the more 
rational a borrower’s strategy to live in the house to be financed at a greatly subsidized cost for the term of 
the teaser rate.  
11 Luigi Zingales frames the point nicely: “[T]his implication of the EMT [ECMH] is not a good theory in 
the Popperian sense (after philosopher Karl Popper) because it is almost impossible to reject.”  Luigi 
Zingales, Learning to Live with Not-So-Efficient Markets, 139 Daedalus 31, 36 (2010).  
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value.  More informationally efficient market prices also can better inform regulators.  
There is reason to believe, for example, that the Federal Reserve had no better 
information concerning the instruments underlying mortgage-backed securities and 
derivatives than did the market.12  If so, more informed market prices might have allowed 
for more calibrated and more prompt regulatory intervention.  Alternatively, prices that 
fail to respond to low-cost, value-relevant information raise a red flag.  The reason may 
be thin trading or a flawed market structure, but it may also be that public-sector agency 
costs impede or distort market activity.13  Thus, attention to the extent to which market 
prices are informationally efficient should be viewed as a complement to effective 
regulation, not as a substitute. 
We address several kinds of regulatory intervention that can increase 
informational efficiency and enhance transparency, ranging from the obvious step of 
enhancing disclosure, to the introduction of stress testing for financial institutions and to 
direct intervention in shaping the market for novel securities such as the collateralized 
debt obligations (“CDOs”) and residential mortgage-backed securities (“RMBS”).  Our 
intention is less to make specific reform proposals—indeed, some reforms we address 
have already been adopted—than it is to demonstrate how the ECMH can usefully inform 
regulatory reform and, conversely, how some widely-accepted reforms implemented in 
the wake of the Crises depend, at least implicitly, on the assumption that there is likely to 
                                                
 
12 See infra note 92 and accompanying text. 
13 By “public sector agency costs” we mean the response of regulators to political pressure.  One example 
is the misaligned incentives of a regulator who must decide whether to dampen trading in a market from 
which institutions with powerful lobbies are profiting. 
 
 
12 
 
be a correlation between the informational efficiency of market prices and fundamental 
value.     
I. “Informational” versus “Fundamental” Efficiency  
As conventionally understood, a market is informationally efficient if investors 
cannot make abnormal returns by trading on public information.14  Note that this 
definition says nothing about the relationship between informational efficiency and the 
fundamental value of securities.  An informationally efficient price may move closer to 
fundamental efficiency if the market price would change should non-public information 
became public, or if frictions associated with the mechanism by which information 
becomes reflected in price were reduced.   
By contrast the fundamental value of a security is conventionally understood to be 
the true present value of its expected future cash flows—as these cash flows are estimated 
and discounted by the market’s valuation model, which is usually presumed to be fixed 
across markets and assets.15  It follows that a market is fundamentally efficient if prices 
accurately track the fundamental values of securities; in colloquial terms, if the market 
price is right.16  Defenders of this ambitious notion of fundamental efficiency concede 
                                                
 
14 The definition in the text encompasses weak form and semi-strong form efficiency—that is, efficiency 
with respect to past and current information.  Strong-form efficiency, in contrast, requires that the market 
price also reflect private information; that is, information that is not public at all.   
15 Fox, Fox & Gilson, supra note 1, at 9–22, 27, provide empirical evidence of the impact of idiosyncratic 
risk on an increase in uncertainty concerning the market’s valuation model. 
16 Fundamental efficiency, thus, is quite different from strong form efficiency; the latter posits that private 
information is reflected in market price; the former claims that the market price is “correct.”  Judge 
Easterbrook, who knows better, conflates the two in Schleicher v. Wendt, 618 F.3d 679, 685 (7th Cir. 
2010).  He correctly describes weak form and semi-strong form efficiency as covering historical prices and 
newly released information, but then states that “[t]he strong version adds a claim that the price set in this 
way is right, in the sense that it accurately reflects the firm’s value.”  Id.  In contrast, the First Circuit gets it 
right when the court states what is necessary to trigger the presumption of reliance provided by Basic´s 
fraud-on-the-market-doctrine:  
For purposes of establishing the fraud-on-the-market presumption of reliance, 
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that perfection is impossible: market traders can know only public information, not the 
private information of corporate managers or the contingent outcomes of future events. 
But this “good enough” fundamental efficiency is often the standard by which the ECMH 
has been judged in the wake of the Subprime Crisis.  And even “good-enough” 
fundamental efficiency raises an awkward question: how do traders know the model that 
should be applied in discounting future cash flows?  And for that matter, how do the 
critics who assert that the ECMH is discredited because it fails the “good enough” 
criterion of market efficiency know the market’s valuation model so they can compare 
the market price to that dictated by the valuation model?  
As noted above, the empirical problem is the absence of a reference point against 
which to measure market prices.  If the prices of mortgage-backed securities are asserted 
to have been inefficient before and after the onset of the Subprime Crisis, the obvious 
riposte is: “As compared to what?”  As noted above, even “good enough” fundamental 
value must be measurable to see if it differs from market price.  Yet as Richard Roll 
pointed out with respect to empirically testing the Capital Asset Pricing Model 
(“CAPM”),17 if we cannot measure the price that CAPM dictates because the market 
portfolio is not observable, we cannot make the price-value comparison either with 
                                                                                                                                            
 
we adopt the prevailing definition of market efficiency, which provides that an efficient 
market is one in which the market price of the stock fully reflects all publicly available 
information.  By “fully reflect,” we mean that market price responds so quickly to new 
information that ordinary investors cannot make trading profits on the basis of such 
information.  This is known as “informational efficiency.”  We reject a second and much 
broader meaning of “fully reflect,” known as “fundamental value efficiency,” which 
requires that a market respond to information not only quickly but accurately, such that 
the market price of a stock reflects its fundamental value.   
In re Polymedica Corp. Sec. Litig., 432 F.3d 1, 19 (1st Cir. 2005); see In re Countrywide Fin. Corp. Sec. 
Litig., 273 F.R.D. 586, 610 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (citing In re Apple Computer Sec. Litig., 886 F.2d 1109, 
1114–15 (9th Cir. 1989)) (affirming that fraud-on-the–market cases are concerned with informational 
efficiency). 
17 We discuss the Capital Asset Pricing Model infra in this Part and in Part II. 
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respect to magnitude or even direction.  Put simply, there is nothing against which to 
measure market price.  The best we can do is find a more or less plausible proxy for the 
market portfolio such as a portfolio of S&P 500 stocks.  A finding that market price 
differs from fundamental value (as measured by CAPM or another valuation model) is 
consistent with either an informationally inefficient market or an incorrect pricing 
model.18     
Roll’s alternative explanations for a discrepancy between a pricing model’s (or a 
proxy for a pricing model) prediction and observable market prices, however, have very 
different implications if market efficiency is used in both its positive and normative 
senses: we want to know if markets are informationally efficient, and we want some 
handle on how to make prices fundamentally efficient.  The policy goal is to eliminate 
frictions.  Informationally efficient markets can then make it easier to determine whether 
the pricing model we employ as a proxy for the “true” but unobservable valuation model 
underlying fundamental value is a reasonable one, or whether, alternatively, market 
prices seem to be largely random or a function of “animal spirits” rather than meaningful 
economic valuation.   
Now consider the ECMH from the standpoint of a sophisticated critic of both its 
fundamental efficiency and informational efficiency variants.  With respect to 
fundamental efficiency, no sophisticated critic of the ECMH would claim to know the 
                                                
 
18 Richard Roll, A Critique of the Asset Pricing Theory’s Tests: Part I: On Past and Potential Testability of 
the Theory, 4 J. Fin. Econ. 129, 130 (1977) (testing difficulties arising from an incomplete proxy for market 
portfolio).  This point has become commonplace in the market efficiency debate. See, e.g., Zingales, supra 
note 11, at 32 (stating that if we reject the equality of market price and fundamental value, “it is unclear 
whether that entails rejecting the asset-pricing model that assesses the fundamental value or rejecting the 
[ECMH]”); Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. 
Fin. 383, 388 (1970).  
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market’s “true” valuation model with certainty.  Rather she would make one of two 
arguments depending on which form of efficiency was at issue.  In the case of 
fundamental efficiency, she would argue that it is possible to develop more or less 
plausible proxies for the unobservable “true” model—and that, in fact, such models are 
developed routinely by investors.  These proxy models then can be back-tested in a rough 
way: the more closely a proxy model’s ex ante predictions approach the observable actual 
present value of the cash payouts from holding securities, the better they are likely to be 
at replicating the “true” model.  Correlatively, if we observe ex post that a given proxy 
model predicts the ex ante present values of future payouts better than contemporaneous 
market prices, then these market prices were plausibly inefficient in the fundamental 
sense (even if they were efficient in the informational sense because arbitrage profits 
were not possible).  The empirical work of the 2013 Nobelist Robert Shiller illustrates 
this kind of critique of fundamental efficiency (i.e., what we term the “inflated” 
ECMH).19  Finally, the critic would note that valuation models change.  Unpredictable 
economic crises—the result of Knightian uncertainty not the resolution of probabilities 
observable ex ante—result in the erosion of confidence that the pre-crisis valuation model 
still was valid in the post-crisis world.  As a consequence, price volatility will increase as 
the number of pieces of new information with implications for stock prices increase 
                                                
 
19 See the Nobel Prize Committee Report, supra note 6, for an excellent summary of Shiller’s empirical 
studies, which range from comparing the long-term volatility of share prices and dividends to developing 
simple models for predicting long-term returns on shareholdings.  Professor Shiller was awarded the 2013 
Nobel Prize in Economic Science together with Eugene Fama and Lars Peter Hansen.  Id.  
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because a range of different models, with respect to which different information is value 
relevant, may turn out to be predictive post-crisis.20  
 A sophisticated critic of the ECMH also would address informational efficiency, 
which rests at the heart of a modest ECMH.  Evaluating the informational efficiency of 
market prices is important in its own right and because it is a prerequisite for fundamental 
efficiency.  Whatever else may be said about the theoretical construct of fundamental 
value, it must certainly be true that a security’s fundamental value incorporates all 
available information that bears on the discounted value of its expected future cash flows.  
The critic’s claim with respect to the informational inefficiency of particular markets 
would be that the release of public information with obvious negative implications for 
market prices under any reasonable valuation model did not in fact affect these prices or, 
still worse, seemed to pressure them in the wrong direction. 
In response to this argument, a defender of the ECMH would readily agree that 
there are circumstances and markets in which price does deviate from any plausible 
notion of value for reasons that have little to do with information.  The classic example is 
a “fire sale” in which sellers must liquidate their inventories for exogenous reasons, but 
sufficient buyers can be found only at very low, distorted prices.21  No one would suggest 
that the price in such a market is informationally efficient other than in the narrow 
context of a forced sale.  In addition, the federal courts are familiar with thinly traded 
securities markets that are almost certainly relatively inefficient even with respect to the 
most inexpensive public information.  In fraud-on-the-market litigation, courts routinely 
                                                
 
20 See Fox, Fox & Gilson, supra note 1, at 23-25, 27-28. 
21 Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, Fire Sales in Finance and Macroeconomics, 25 J. Econ. Persp. 29, 30 
(2011). 
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rule on the informational efficiency of markets in particular securities in determining 
whether to certify a plaintiffs class.22  Not surprisingly, one of the most important legal 
tests of efficiency is the extent to which the market responds to new information that has 
obvious implications for a security’s value.  A market may not respond to such 
information for the simple reason that trades are few and the security is illiquid as a 
result.23  An implicit qualification of the ECMH is that one cannot expect informationally 
efficient prices without active trading.  Finally, there is the issue of primary markets. A 
security’s issuing price precedes its active trading price.  It is active trading that 
aggregates information in price, which is why a claim of price efficiency is weaker all 
else equal for prices in initial public offerings than for prices in actively-traded secondary 
markets.  This point is particularly relevant in analyzing the implications of the Subprime 
Crisis for the ECMH, as we demonstrate below. 
Stepping out of the roles of critic or defender of the ECMH, what should we 
conclude thus far?  First, that direct testing of fundamental efficiency is impossible in 
theory but that if we lower our standard of rigor, it is possible to use proxy models of 
various sorts to assess whether it is more or less likely that a market is fundamentally 
efficient.  Second, the informational efficiency of market prices can be tested more easily 
                                                
 
22 See note 5 supra (explaining that the presumption of reliance necessary to certify a class in a securities 
fraud class is conditional on a finding that the relevant market was informationally efficient). 
23 The standard criteria used by courts to make the assessment of market efficiency in securities class 
actions are: (1) the trading volume of the security; (2) the number of analysts following the security; (3) the 
issuer’s eligibility to file SEC Form S-3; (4) the presence of market makers in the security; and (5) 
empirical evidence suggesting a causal connection between new information and price movement.  See, 
e.g., In re Countrywide Fin. Corp. Sec. Litig., 273 F.R.D. 586, 611–12 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (citing Cammer v. 
Bloom, 711 F. Supp. 1264, 1284, 1286–87 (D.N.J. 1989)).  From our perspective, this list combines a direct 
test of a market’s relative efficiency (whether the price moves in response to value relevant new 
information), and measures related to the mechanisms by which new information is incorporated into 
market price—the number of analysts, the characteristics necessary to use Form S-3, and the number of 
market makers. 
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and with more definitive results.  Third, informational efficiency is a precondition for 
fundamental efficiency, implying that informationally inefficient prices cannot be 
fundamentally efficient.  Our normative point, addressed in Part IV, then follows: making 
markets more informationally efficient is also likely to nudge their prices in the direction 
of the fundamental efficiency regardless of valuation models.         
II. The Origins of the ECMH and the Concept of Relative Informational Efficiency  
 To better illustrate the relationship between market imperfections and the 
informational efficiency of market prices, we begin with a capsule account of the 
development of the ECMH.24  As noted earlier, the assumption of perfect markets 
underlay the major theoretical developments in financial economics between the late 
1950s and the early 1970s, including CAPM25 and the Miller-Modigliani Irrelevance 
Propositions.26  The logic of these theories was compelling in a world of perfect 
markets—which included, of course, the assumption that market prices reflected all 
relevant information.  The theoretical power of perfectly informed prices easily led to the 
question whether prices in some real markets might roughly approximate fully-informed 
prices, at least with respect to publicly available information.  This conjecture was at the 
core of an empirical ECMH as this was set out by the recent Nobelist Eugene Fama in a 
seminal 1970 article reviewing the empirical literature on the efficiency with which 
public equity prices reflected data from three information sets—past price history, public 
                                                
 
24 We have previously described the conduits though which information enters price in an actively traded 
market as “the mechanisms of market efficiency.”  Gilson & Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market 
Efficiency, supra note 9, at 565–67. 
25 See William F. Sharpe, Capital Asset Prices: A Theory of Market Equilibrium Under Conditions of Risk, 
19 J. Fin. 425 (1964). 
26 Franco Modigliani & Merton H. Miller, The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of 
Investment, 48 Am. Econ. Rev. 261, 266–67 (1958); Merton H. Miller & Franco Modigliani, Dividend 
Policy, Growth, and the Valuation of Shares, 34 J. Bus. 411, 411–12 (1961). 
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information, and all information (including private information)— which define the now-
famous trichotomy of “weak,” “semi-strong,” and “strong” form informational 
efficiency.27  Financial economists quickly accepted the semi-strong (or public 
information) form of the ECMH, even to the point of suggesting that it was almost 
tautological.  Commenting on Fama’s 1970 article, his contemporary William Sharpe 
stated: “Simply put, the thesis is this: that in a well-functioning securities market, the 
prices of [securities] will reflect predictions based on all relevant and available 
information.  This seems to be trivially self-evident to most professional economists—so 
much so, that testing seems rather silly.”28  Ten years later, William Beaver made much 
the same point: “Why would one ever expect prices not to ‘fully reflect’ publicly 
available information?  Won’t market efficiency hold trivially?”29  Absent frictions, the 
arbitrage machine should logically ensure that price fully reflects available information. 
 Despite logic and evidence, however, the institutional question remained: How 
could real markets seem to reflect public information instantaneously?30  Why didn’t 
                                                
 
27 See Fama, supra note 18, at 383.  
28 William F. Sharpe, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work: Discussion, 25 
J. Fin. 418, 418 (1970). 
29 William H. Beaver, Market Efficiency, 56 Acct. Rev. 23, 32 (1981). 
30 The extent to which CAPM, the Irrelevance Propositions, and the ECMH were originally proffered as 
perfect market theorems with the goal of framing a research agenda that would relax the perfect market 
assumptions to understand how real markets work and how real institutions respond to market 
imperfections is an interesting question.  Those who proffered the theories later came to understand their 
work in that fashion.  Assessing thirty years of efforts to show what market imperfections falsify the 
Irrelevance Propositions, Merton Miller acknowledged that “[l]ooking back now, perhaps we should have 
put more emphasis on the other, upbeat side of the ‘nothing matters’ coin: showing what doesn’t matter can 
also show, by implication, what does.”  Merton H. Miller, The Modigliani-Miller Propositions After Thirty 
Years, 2 J. Econ. Persp. 99, 100 (1988).  Sharpe himself acknowledged in his Nobel lecture that CAPM is 
compromised when there are institutional restrictions on short-selling. William F. Sharpe, Capital Asset 
Prices With and Without Negative Holdings, 46 J. Fin. 489, 489, 500–08 (1991).  And one of the authors 
roughly framed the role of business lawyers as that of transaction cost engineers, whose task was to craft a 
transaction structure that allowed the parties to act as if CAPM’s perfect market assumptions were really 
true.  Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pricing, 94 Yale L.J. 
239, 253–55 (1984). 
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market frictions drive a large wedge between the point at which public information was 
announced and the point at which it seemed to be fully reflected in actual prices—at least 
in actively-traded public equity markets?  Why didn’t market frictions—information 
costs—determine how rapidly most public information seemed to be impounded in stock 
prices? 
We explored this question at length in a 1984 article31 because it seemed obvious 
to us that prices couldn’t respond instantaneously to new public information except in 
unusual cases.  In real markets informational efficiency was necessarily a relative 
concept.  Depending on the level of frictions, market prices would reflect different kinds 
of information with greater or less “relative efficiency.”32  Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay 
echoed this conclusion twelve years later in a standard text on the econometrics of 
finance: “The notion of relative efficiency . . . may be a more useful concept than the all-
or-nothing view taken by much of the traditional market-efficiency literature.”33  
Our argument proceeded by expanding Fama’s three categories of information 
into four mechanisms by which prices could impound information and four categories of 
                                                
 
31 Gilson & Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, supra note 9, at 565–67. 
32 Id.  
33 John Y. Campbell, Andrew W. Lo & A. Craig MacKinlay, The Econometrics of Financial Markets 24–
25 (1997). The quote continues: 
The advantages of relative efficiency over absolute efficiency are easy to see by way of 
an analogy. Physical systems are often given an efficiency rating based on the relative 
proportion of energy or fuel converted to useful work. Therefore, a piston engine may be 
rated at 60% efficiency, meaning that on average 60% of the energy contained in the 
engine’s fuel is used to turn the crankshaft, with the remaining 40% lost to other forms of 
work such as heat, light, or noise. 
Few engineers would ever consider performing a statistical test to determine 
whether or not a given engine is perfectly efficient—such an engine exists only in the 
idealized frictionless world of the imagination. But measuring relative efficiency—
relative to the frictionless ideal—is commonplace. 
Id.  
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increasingly costly information.34  By the early 1980s, a large body of empirical work 
demonstrated that stock prices responded extremely rapidly to most public—and even 
“semi-public”—information: in fact they responded so rapidly that investors could not 
make arbitrage profits by trading on this information.  We conjectured that two market 
mechanisms explain the rapid response of prices to such information: first, virtually all 
professional traders learn of certain information nearly simultaneously,35 making a 
(nearly) instantaneous price response inevitable; or, second, a much smaller—but still 
sufficient—fraction of market professionals learn of new information within a short time 
frame—say, minutes or hours—and rush to trade on it before it is fully reflected in 
market prices.  The second mechanism also causes market prices to reflect new 
information very rapidly, although not as rapidly as the first mechanism.  Put differently, 
the second mechanism, which we termed “professionally-informed trading,” is relatively 
less efficient than the first.  In highly liquid markets such as those in exchange-traded 
stocks, some degree of inefficiency must always remain in order to permit savvy 
investors to earn at least normal market returns on average, and hence to incur the costs 
of analyzing and trading on new public information at all.36  But if the second mechanism 
is relatively less efficient than the first, it is still efficient enough to allow prices to reflect 
                                                
 
34 Gilson & Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, supra note 9, at 592-93. 
35 Consider, for example, an announcement by the Federal Reserve of a major change in its quantitative 
easing policy. 
36 As pointed out by Stanford Grossman and Joseph Stiglitz, professional traders must earn a normal return 
to incur the transaction costs of trading on new information.  Sanford J. Grossman & Joseph E. Stiglitz, On 
the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient Markets, 70 Am. Econ Rev. 393, 393, 404–05 (1980).  It 
follows that prices can never be completely efficient vis-à-vis public information that is not universally 
known; there must always be some informational inefficiency to motivate arbitrage.  
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much information that is understood and acted on by relatively small numbers of traders 
almost as rapidly as information that the entire market learns at once.37  
Other mechanisms for incorporating other kinds of information in price are much 
less efficient.  For example, private information known only to insiders is likely to enter 
the market gradually, after insiders begin to trade on it and savvy outsiders subsequently 
deduce its content by observing insider trades or decoding unexpected movements in the 
market.  In the public equity markets, the classic example is undisclosed corporate inside 
information that enters market prices only after managers trade on it or leak it to a 
handful of outsiders.  Finally, a fourth remarkable if relatively inefficient market 
mechanism serves to channel noisy information into price even though no one knows this 
information for certain: this is the ability of market prices (in the right circumstances) to 
aggregate the independent forecasts of many traders with heterogeneous information, and 
thereby reflect in market price a collective forecast that is better informed than the 
forecast of any individual trader.38  As a partial illustration, consider instances in which 
stock prices remain unaffected by the announcement of an economically significant 
                                                
 
37 Note that we did not—and do not—assume that these savvy traders know the precise weight that the 
market’s implicit asset pricing model will assign information, whether it is semi-public, private, or 
unknown as of yet.  In most circumstances, good traders will have a contextual understanding of the 
market’s pricing model.  For example, if newly released financial information leads expert analysts to 
question the “quality” of a firm’s earnings (and therefore its future prospects), these analysts know that the 
firm’s share price will fall relative to its price a moment before the information was released.  They are also 
likely to have a rough idea of how far it will fall most of the time. In times of economic crisis, however, 
traders will have much less situational knowledge of the market’s pricing model and so volatility—the 
number of pieces of new information with implications for the stock’s price—will increase accordingly.  
See Fox, Fox & Gilson, supra note 1, at 23–25, 27–28. 
38 We term this last mechanism “uninformed trading.”  Gilson & Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market 
Efficiency, supra note 9, at 579–80.  It is the least efficient of the four market mechanisms, precisely 
because the true content of information is unknown and, as a result, price “averages” the partial information 
and opinion of all investors democratically.  Id.  We term the other three mechanisms, respectively, 
“universally informed trading,” “professionally informed trading,” and “derivatively informed trading.”  Id. 
at 566. 
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change in the Fed’s monetary policy because the change is said to have been correctly 
forecast by the market well before it was announced, i.e., it was “priced into” market 
prices prior to its announcement. 
Note, however, that all of the preceding mechanisms for introducing information 
into price depend on the costs of information and the costs of arbitrage—that is, the costs 
of trading on information.  Our previous articles have focused principally on 
determinants of these two categories of cost in the relatively well-functioning and 
continuous markets for public equities.39  For example, in our 1984 article, we argued 
that information costs determine how widely particular information is distributed in a 
market, and therefore the relative efficiency of the market mechanism that incorporates it 
into price.40  Much of our discussion there focused on the market frictions that contribute 
to information cost and the market institutions and regulatory interventions that have 
responded to these frictions.  We continue to stress the costs of acquiring information in 
out reprise of the Subprime Crisis below; indeed, some information was not available at 
any feasible price.  However, our account gives equal weight to the costs of trading on 
acquired information in order to introduce it into price.  As we argue below, in the 
various markets associated with RMBS, frictions introduced by the market structure itself 
often made the mechanism by which information comes to be incorporated into price 
much more salient than it is in the public equities markets.  We now turn in Part III to an 
account of the determinants of informational efficiency of prices in the several Crisis-
                                                
 
39 Id.; Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency Twenty Years Later: 
The Hindsight Bias, 28 J. Corp. L. 715 (2003). 
40 Id. 592  
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related securities markets.41  As we will see, the magnitude of these costs figured 
centrally in the Subprime Crisis.  And as we will argue in Part IV, the ECMH, properly 
understood, focuses our attention on reducing these costs. 
III. The Subprime Crisis and Informational Efficiency 
 
  Assessing the ECMH in light of the Subprime Crisis must begin by noting that at 
least three markets in securities and their associated derivatives are implicated in the 
Crisis: the markets in RMBS, in CDOs (bonds tied largely to the returns on RMBS), and 
in the stocks of financial institutions that were themselves active in the RMBS-CDO 
market as originators, securitizers, underwriters, insurers, or investors in the markets for 
                                                
 
41 It is helpful to distinguish here between two common uses of the term “informational efficiency”—and 
among several meanings of “market”—that are sometimes conflated.  As noted above, informational 
efficiency in the context of the ECMH refers to the speed with which particular information is fully 
reflected in the price of a given security.  As we note in the text, however, that the rapid reflection of 
information into price is a function of the trading market as well as the availability of the information.  This 
implies that prices may be relatively very efficient with respect to available information, but also relatively 
“uninformed” in the sense that much value-relevant information about a security may not be available.  Or 
put differently, securities prices that are relatively very efficient in reflecting information are not 
necessarily deeply informed.  The converse is not true, however.  A thin trading market—say, an over-the-
counter market in which a trade occurs once a week—may be very slow in reflecting even low-cost public 
information.  The particular market mechanisms that reflect information in price in a securities market 
depend on the distribution—and hence the cost—of the information.  See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 
9, at 592–93; see supra note 9 and accompanying text.  But in the absence of active trading and visible 
prices, even the cheapest information may fail to be fully reflected in price.  
       The second point concerning the use of the term market also requires clarification.  There is, on one 
level, a single secondary market in public equities in America (“The Market”), insofar as a relatively well-
defined list of stocks is subject to the same disclosure requirements, the same regulator, the same liability 
rules, etc.  On another institutional level, there are multiple markets with different institutional 
underpinnings; for example, issuers whose shares trade on the NYSE, NASDAQ, in “blind pools,” over-
the-counter, etc.—and are subject to commensurately more or less exacting scrutiny by auditors, investors, 
regulators, analysts, and the press according to their market capitalization and other factors.  For purposes 
of addressing relative market efficiency, however, the relevant market is still more specific: it is the market 
in the particular security under consideration, a market that is nested in the broader institutional context of 
The Market (i.e., the institutional and legal structures that govern trading in all public equities).  Thus, to 
ask whether the American market in publicly traded equities is relatively efficient is ambiguous.  A much 
more meaningful question is whether market prices for specific equities subject to a threshold level of 
trading volume and a certain level of scrutiny by auditors, analysts, regulators, and the investing public are 
likely to be semi-strong form efficient.  The federal courts must ask just this question in assessing the 
merits of fraud-on-the-market litigation.  See note 5 supra. 
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mortgage-backed securities.  Evaluating a modest ECMH, as we have defined it, requires 
some discussion of each these markets.  In each, the inquiry must be whether prices in 
one or more class of securities responded rapidly (i.e., with relative efficiency) to the 
public release of new, value-relevant information—at least when the ECMH would lead 
us to expect a relatively efficient price response to the new information.  Conversely, do 
market frictions—high information costs and severe constraints on effective arbitrage—
lead us to expect a high degree of market inefficiency, implying that the ECMH is a 
useful tool for understanding and possibly improving the informational quality of market 
prices?   
ECMH critics might argue that market prices failed to reflect various kinds of 
information efficiently (or at all) prior to the Crisis, some of which were specific to the 
markets in particular securities.  Yet, information about the likely future behavior of the 
housing market and the default risks associated with subprime and alt-prime mortgages 
was clearly relevant in all of the securities markets associated with the Crisis.  To reprise 
the familiar, the residential housing market—not a securities market—was the foundation 
on which prices in all of the Crisis-related securities markets depended.  We concur with 
the now widely accepted view that the housing market experienced an enormous bubble 
beginning in 2001, if not earlier, and ending in the fourth quarter of 2007, when housing 
generally collapsed.42  The source of this bubble was macroeconomic but it was 
                                                
 
42 On this point we differ from Eugene Fama, the most prominent advocate of ECMH.  See John Cassidy, 
Interview with Eugene Fama, The New Yorker (Jan. 13, 2010), 
www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/johncassidy/2010/01/interview-with-eugene-fama.html.  Fama 
conjectures that housing prices fell victim to an incipient worldwide recession, which was unforeseen by 
almost all sophisticated financial actors.  Id.  In our view, however, whether one believes that a bubble in 
the housing market and its associated financial assets triggered the crisis, or whether one believes, as Fama 
does, that developments in the real economy triggered a fall in real estate prices and the subprime crisis, 
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exacerbated by the markets in mortgage-backed securities.  A substantial increase in 
global liquidity reduced the price of credit, which in turn increased the demand—and 
hence the price—of homes. In addition, new mortgage products that required little or no 
down payment further expanded the availability of credit, and thus also increased demand 
for housing with a similar effect on housing prices.  In particular, mortgage products with 
low introductory interest rates encouraged home sales even when buyers might be unable 
to service their mortgages after their initially low “teaser” interest rates ended two or 
three years out.  This increased the numbers of potential homebuyers relative to the much 
lower rate of growth in housing stock, and thus also increased housing prices, at least for 
the short run.43   
One critical “bit” of information thus may be “public” in the sense of being cheap 
to acquire: namely, knowledge of the existence of a housing bubble and its corollary, the 
knowledge that sooner or later residential real estate prices were likely to fall—and 
perhaps even fall dramatically.  It seems plausible that many savvy investors in the 
mortgage-backed securities had this knowledge.  As early as 2003, Robert Shiller 
provided strong evidence of a housing market bubble.  Moreover, a close student of the 
Crisis, the economist Gary Gorton, has asserted that, contrary to the popular accounts, 
investors generally believed that real estate prices had entered a bubble phase at least two 
years before the crash occurred.  Nevertheless, this knowledge alone was not enough to 
                                                                                                                                            
 
does not bear importantly on the modest conception of the ECMH that we discuss in this Article or the 
policy implications that follow from it.  
43 By housing bubble we only mean that housing was costly relative to historical prices.  Was housing also 
costly relative to its “fundamental value?” In light of what level of liquidity and over what range of 
mortgage products should fundamental value be measured?  The condition of the housing market and the 
mortgage financing that fueled it are critical to assessing the implications of the Subprime Crisis for the 
ECMH, but the housing market itself is not a trading market in which the informational efficiency of prices 
can be easily evaluated. 
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induce them to take the risky step of shorting mortgage-backed securities markets (to the 
extent that this was possible).  The investors who did take this step and profited as a 
result were not visionaries; rather they were lucky in their timing, since “[m]any saw the 
coming crisis.  This was the subject of intense debate, starting in 2005.”44   
Assume, then, that many professional investors recognized a bubble in housing 
prices and forecast a sharp decline or even a crisis in the housing market by the start of 
2005.  There were still two other critical bits of information missing: a useful forecast of 
when the bubble was likely to burst and knowledge of the consequence of a sharp drop in 
housing prices for each of the relevant securities.  We argue below that this information 
was likely to have been much more difficult—i.e., costly—for investors to obtain than a 
general sense that the housing market was overpriced.  Additionally, we argue that 
insight into the timing of the crash and its likely consequences might not have reached 
prices in the mortgage-backed securities markets even if it were “known” to a minority of 
traders.  We proceed below to examine each of the relevant securities markets. 
A.  The RMBS Market 
Most residential mortgages (aside from non-conforming jumbo mortgages) were 
bundled into pools and sold to passive “special purpose vehicles” for purposes of 
securitization.  These entities purchased mortgages with funds raised by selling fixed-
income securities to investors—tranched bonds backed by the cash flows of the mortgage 
pools.  Bonds backed by the most senior tranche of RMBS generally received an AAA 
                                                
 
44 Gary Gorton, Book Review, 49 J. Econ. Literature 450, 451 (2011). 
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rating by at least two of the three major rating agencies.45  Subordinated bonds were rated 
AA, A, and so forth down to BBB-, the lowest investment-grade rating below which 
there was only a thin level of unrated “equity.”  Senior RMBS bonds were liquid and 
traded frequently until the Crisis was in full bloom during the last months of 2007, even 
when they were issued by exclusively subprime mortgage pools.  Bonds backed by lower 
tranches of a mortgage pool—for example, the BBB or BBB- bonds—were less liquid.    
The RMBS, in turn, spawned two derivative markets.  The first was the OTC 
market in credit default swaps (“CDS”) written on RMBS bonds, which were initially 
introduced to large investors in January 2005.46  CDS contracts on bonds are a form of 
default insurance that requires the buyer to pay a percentage of the face value of a bond 
or other credit obligation in exchange for the seller’s promise to reimburse the face value 
of the debt (minus its residual market value) should the debt default.  Over-the-counter 
CDS contracts became the first cost-efficient way to short RMBS-backed bonds.47   
The second derivative to emerge from the RMBS market extended only to bonds 
backed by subprime mortgage pools.48  This was the trading platform in so-called “ABX” 
indices that were introduced by Markit, a UK corporation, in January 2006.  Markit 
referenced its subprime indices to the market prices of bonds issued by the twenty largest 
                                                
 
45 The three major rating agencies are Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s Investors Services, and Fitch.  See 
generally, John C. Coffee, Jr., Ratings Reform: The Good, The Bad, and The Ugly, 1 Harv. Bus. L. Rev. 
231, 248 (2011) (discussing rating agencies and the subprime crisis). 
46 John Geanakoplos, Solving the Present Crisis and Managing the Leverage Cycle 111 (Cowles Found. for 
Research in Econ. Yale Univ., Cowles Found. Paper No. 1305, 2010), available at 
http://dido.wss.yale.edu/P/cp/p13a/p1305.pdf; accord Luigi Zingales, Credit Default Swaps on Trial, 
Project Syndicate (Apr. 19, 2010), http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/credit-default-swaps-on-
trial.  A standardized CDS contract for RMBS bonds was later introduced by the International Swaps and 
Derivatives Association in June 2005.  See Michael Lewis, The Big Short: Inside the Doomsday Machine 
49 (2010). 
47 See Lewis, supra note 46, at 11.  
48 Subprime mortgages refer to those mortgages offered to borrowers with poor credit histories and are 
characterized by their high interest rates, relatively unfavorable terms, and low-quality collateral. 
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RMBS offerings within a discrete six-month period, beginning with subprime RMBS 
bonds issued during the second half of 2005.  These ABX indices reflected an 
unweighted average of the prices of the rated bonds issued against each tranche of RMBS 
mortgage pools.  In effect, the ABX market offered a vehicle for investors to go long or 
short in any rated tranche of the subprime RMBS market.  Soon after the ABX market 
opened, volume ballooned—much of it initiated by investors shorting subprime bonds. 
Much of this shorting may have been by large banks and other institutions seeking to set 
off the risk they bore on large stocks of subprime RMBS, which they held either on their 
own accounts or as “warehoused” bonds for later use in the construction of third-level 
mortgaged-backed securities discussed below.49  Doubtlessly, investors seeking naked 
bets against subprime mortgage markets accounted for additional shorting activity.  At 
the outset of trading on ABX indices in January 2006, subprime mortgages comprised 
roughly a quarter of the entire mortgage-backed securities market.50   
Prices in the ABX market provided low-cost information on how investors as a 
whole evaluated the quality of these securities—information that had hitherto been 
unavailable.  The effect was transformational.  In the words of Gary Gorton: “With the 
advent of the ABX indices, market participants could, for the first time, express views 
about the value of subprime bonds, by buying or selling protection.  For the first time 
information about subprime values and risks was aggregated and revealed.”51  
                                                
 
49 The history and structure of the ABX securities indices are canvassed in Nancy Wallace, The Bear’s 
Lair: Index Credit Default Swaps and the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, 1–4 (Feb. 2, 2011) (unpublished 
manuscript) available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1787848. 
50 See Lewis, supra note 46, at 27. 
51 Gary B. Gorton, Information, Liquidity, and the (Ongoing) Panic of 2007 4 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. 
Research, Working Paper No. 14649, 2009), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w14649.  See Gary B. 
Gorton, The Subprime Panic 23-24, (NBER Working Paper No. 14398, available at 
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Since highly rated RMBS were relatively liquid in the over-the-counter market 
and subprime indices were actively traded on an exchange, pricing in both markets 
clearly responded to new information.  Indeed, price movements in ABX indices during 
the Crisis predicted price movements in broader markets by as much as three weeks—
either by informing these large markets or by causing them to react.52  To be sure, heavy 
shorting of the ABX indices lowered their implicit returns below those of the cash 
securities underlying the indices in late 2006.  For example, for months the market priced 
the ABX BBB index at thirty basis points below the return on the cash subprime BBB 
bonds that the ABX BBB tranche indexed.  This may have been an instance of 
inefficiency in these markets; the returns on the BBB index and the referenced BBB cash 
assets should have been identical or nearly so.53  If so, however, it was an inefficiency 
that was heavily arbitraged.  Equally important, the extent to which enormous demand for 
protection against a decline in the housing market pushed down the prices of the ABX 
seems in retrospect to be a hint of the Crisis yet to come in late 2007.54 
                                                                                                                                            
 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w14398 (arguing that ABX indices solved the RMBS market’s common 
knowledge problem).  Contemporaneous market professionals made the same point well before Gordon 
did.  E.g., Kevin Kendra, Fitch, “Tranche ABX and Basis Risk in Subprime RMBS Structured Portfolios,” 
(Feb. 20, 2007), available at 
http://www.fitchratings.com/web_content/sectors/subprime/Basis_in_ABX_TABX_Bespoke_SF_CDOs. 
Ppt (The ABX.HE has proven to be effective in providing market transparency in an otherwise 
opaque market); Dubitsky, R., C. Mellia, R. Bhu, C. Fenske, J. Guo, S. Li, L. Dumitrascu, and L. 
Yang, Introduction to ABS-­‐CDS and the ABX index (Fixed income research, Credit Suisse, Jan 25 2006) 
(describing trading strategies and arbitrage opportunities opened up by ABX indices). 
52 See Francis A. Longstaff, The Subprime Credit Crisis and Contagion in Financial Markets, 97 J. Fin. 
Econ. 436, 437 (2010); Wall St. Journal, Feb. 27, 2007, available at       (quoting CreditSight analyst, 
“[T]he the ABX is accurately reflecting the panic being felt by some of the big mortgage players”). 
53 See Gorton, Information, Liquidity and the (On-going) Panic of 2007, supra note 51, at 7 fig. 2.  
54 For further evidence that the demand for these securities as insurance drove down the price of the index 
such that it no longer served as an accurate measure of the default risk associated with the securities, see 
Wallace, supra note 49, at 44.  In effect, the price overstated the likelihood of default because the security 
price was driven by demand for the insurance function rather than expected future defaults.   
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 Given that the secondary markets in RMBS subprime ABX indices were 
reasonable candidates for reflecting public or semi-public information in prices, the issue 
is whether they did so.  What information—assuming it was widely known—failed to 
enter prices at this intermediate level?   
 Consider first the declining quality of the mortgages that flowed into subprime 
mortgage pools.  At least prior to 2006, it seems that prices of bonds issued against 
subprime mortgage pools failed to reflect the progressive deterioration of the quality of 
subprime mortgages.  Some commentators assert that this decline in mortgage quality 
was clearly evident as early as late 2005.55  Would the failure of prices to reflect this 
information imply price inefficiency?  Recall that the market in ABX indices was 
introduced in January 2006.  Before this, RMBS price information in the OTC market 
was qualified and incomplete.  Perhaps the timing of the introduction of the ABX indices 
was not accidental.  In any event, the new ABX market faced strong and immediate 
shorting of subprime bonds, driven in no small part by the demand for insurance by those 
holding the securities.  In addition, increasing housing prices would have disguised the 
declining quality of subprime mortgages as long as increases in home prices continued.  
Even the worst “liar loan” retained its value if it paid interest and was easily refinanced.  
Thus, information about the deteriorating quality of subprime mortgages may have been a 
secondary consideration to market traders.    
And what of the alleged failure of the broader RMBS market to anticipate the 
decline in home prices?  Here we plead no contest.  As indicated above, many investors 
                                                
 
55 Yuliya Demyanyk & Otto Van Hemert, Understanding the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, 24 Rev. Fin. Stud. 
1848 (2012). 
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suspected a housing bubble and yet remained deeply uncertain about the timing and 
extent of its correction.  Housing prices had risen almost continuously for three decades 
prior to the Subprime Crisis.56  Moreover, there was a twist in the mortgage-backed 
securities markets.  The consequences of increasing default rates differed significantly by 
rating in the RMBS market—most AAA RMBS bonds retained their value throughout the 
Subprime Crisis.  By contrast, the positions of holders of AAA bonds in mezzanine CDO 
bonds—considered below—were initially more opaque and ultimately far less favorable 
than those of the holders of AAA RMBS bonds.  
In addition, a third sort of relevant pricing information is endogenous to 
hierarchically layered markets.  Continued institutional demand for AAA bonds in the 
top-tier CDO market had raised the value of the assets in the markets below.  Securitizers 
of mortgage pools depended on CDOs to place their riskier securities, and the demand for 
mezzanine CDO AAA securities in turn stimulated originators to generate more 
                                                
 
56 See, e.g., Gary B. Gorton, Misunderstanding Financial Crises: Why We Don’t See Them Coming 221; 
(2012); Wallace, supra note 49, at 29–30.  Among other evidence indicating that market professionals did 
not anticipate a break in housing prices during the 2004-2006 period is data  indicating that a large sample 
of mid-level executives in securitized financing personally invested in real estate as aggressively—if not 
more aggressively—than comparably situated control groups.  Ing-Haw Cheng, et al., Wall Street and the 
Housing Bubble (Working Paper 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2232233. There is of course 
apparently contradictory evidence that some investment bankers underwriting CDOs knew perfectly well 
that the subprime RMBS they placed in their CDO asset portfolios were of particularly low quality and 
likely to default within a time span brief enough to profit from shorting their own CDOs.  See, e.g., Jesse 
Eisinger, Financial Crisis Suit Suggests Bad Behavior at Morgan Stanley, N.Y. Times, Jan. 23, 2013 at    
(bankers jokely referred to CDOs created and sold to Chinese and Taiwanese Banks in the first half of 2006 
as “Subprime Meltdown,” “Hitman,” and “Nuclear Holocaust” before shorting their own creation).  
Assuming the worst, however, this evidence does not necessarily bear on what these banks assumed to be 
the case about the RMBS market in general since it appears that they cherry picked the market for 
especially default-prone RMBS mortgage pools.  Similarly there is evidence that investors who invested 
heavily in private information were able to profit handsomely from long positions in RMBS through the 
Crisis and afterwards.  See BlackRock Solutions Financial Markets advisory group, Financial Markets 
Advisory: Residential Mortgages (Dec. 2010) (touting performance of RMBS investments informed by 
proprietary zipcode-level, continuously-updated mortgage data and proprietary valuation models). Again, 
however, earning strong positive returns on long positions in RMBS—including RMBS backed by 
subprime mortgages—required costly information and cherry picking for particularly low-risk mortgage 
pools that were mispriced by a less well-informed market. 
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mortgages, which, as noted before, further inflated housing prices.  Nevertheless, housing 
purchases were the prime movers in the cycle.  Changes in home prices registered 
virtually instantaneously in the movement of ABX indices, while institutional purchasers 
of AAA CDO bonds were much slower to react to declining housing prices.   
B.  The Market for CDOs and Associated Derivatives 
The second mortgage-backed bond market central to the Subprime Crisis was the 
market for CDO bonds.  This market was at the top of the market hierarchy in 
mortgaged-backed securities in much the same sense that the housing market was at the 
bottom.  Like RMBS entities, CDOs were special purpose vehicles that issued bonds 
backed by the returns on variously rated tranches of their underlying asset pools.  Most 
mortgage-linked CDO assets were mid- and lower-tranche RMBS holdings, although 
higher-tranche RMBS bonds, and even securitized credit card and corporate debt, might 
also have been included in the mix.  Unlike the pools of securitized mortgages, however, 
CDO asset portfolios were actively managed; that is, as bonds in these portfolios 
matured, CDO “managers” selected new assets as replacements—again, usually the BBB 
or “mezzanine” tranches of RMBS bonds. CDO managers also conventionally selected 
the inventory in a CDO’s initial portfolio and earned embedded fees that were senior to 
any distributions to CDO bondholders.  For example, a CDO—call it “IBEX” —might 
purchase all of one subprime RMBS’ BBB bonds, half of another’s A- bonds, and so on, 
until IBEX had an asset pool that included various tranche-backed bonds of 100 RMBSs. 
IBEX would then divide its cash flows into as many as thirteen rated tranches, each of 
which would then collateralize classes of bonds for purchase by institutional investors.  
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The value of a typical CDO’s asset portfolio was enormous in comparison to the 
value of the individual securitized mortgage pools: One or two billion-dollar CDO 
entities were the norm.  CDOs that relied primarily on RMBS assets emerged on a large 
scale in 2005, peaked in 2006, and dwindled to almost nothing by the first quarter of 
2008.57  Commentators generally agree that a principal reason for the rise in CDOs 
during 2005 and 2006 was an effort by underwriters to create buyers for otherwise 
illiquid mezzanine RMBS tranches.58  Levintin and Wachter argue that the 2005 to 2006 
explosion in CDO issues extended the Subprime Crisis by creating demand for 
mezzanine RMBS securities (for example, BBB- bonds) that would otherwise have 
choked the securitization “pipeline,”59 that is, the originators, securitization specialists, 
CDO sponsors, and CDO underwriters that created and distributed products to meet 
strong investor demand for AAA and AAA+ bonds.  By 2005, fifty percent of higher 
quality senior CDO bonds and seventy-seven percent of senior mezzanine CDO bonds 
were collateralized by subprime mortgages assets.60    
The rating agencies routinely awarded the coveted AAA rating to bonds backed 
by the top tranches of CDOs even though the cash flows of these CDOs derived largely 
from riskier BBB tranches of RMBS mortgage pools—and often from those of subprime 
BBB tranches at that.  Whether this was—or was not—paradoxical was a matter of 
perspective at the time.  If, after all, ten percent of all RMBS mortgage pools were to 
default on all of their bonds (from equity to AAA)—a worst case scenario in 2005—the 
                                                
 
57 See Gary Gorton, The Subprime Panic, 15 Eur. Fin. Mgmt. 10, 26 tbl.5 (2009). 
58 See id. at 25–26. 
59 See Adam J. Levitin & Susan M. Wachter, Explaining the Housing Bubble, 100 Geo. L.J. 1177, 1237–42 
(2012). 
60 Gorton, supra note 57, at 27 tbl.5.  
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remaining ninety percent of the BBB cash flows would suffice to cover a CDO’s line of 
AAA-rated bonds.  The risk profile of the typical mezzanine CDO allocated sixty-two 
percent of its net cash flows to senior AAA bonds, fourteen percent to junior AAA bonds, 
and eight percent to AA bonds.  A ten percent default rate in the underlying subprime 
collateral would still permit these three (senior AAA to AA) bonds to be paid in full 
while the remaining A through BBB- bonds and a thin layer of unrated “equity” took the 
hit.61  In addition, CDO issuers typically fortified their senior (or “super safe”) AAA 
bonds with risk-limiting devices, such as placing some conspicuously low-risk assets in 
their asset portfolios or over-collateralizing top-tranche bonds by shifting risk to lower 
tranches.   
Alas, however, a different outcome would follow if no RMBS entity defaulted on 
all of its bonds but numerous entities defaulted on bonds of BBB seniority and below.  As 
proved to be the case, this would happen if cash flows across RMBS were highly 
correlated.  And its consequence would be that mezzanine CDOs that issued bonds 
against asset pools that included many BBB RMBS bonds might be forced to default on 
even their most senior AAA bonds.   
By and large, the underwriters of CDOs were the large investment and 
commercial banks.  CDOs were usually issued directly to their ultimate purchasers who, 
in the case of AAA rated bonds, were generally institutional investors such as insurance 
companies, pension funds, hedge funds, or German Landesbanken.  These CDOs were 
bespoke and illiquid.  For the most part, they were acquired as long-term portfolio 
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assets.62  Indeed, most institutional investors would only purchase CDO bonds at an 
initial distribution--that is, in the “primary market,”--thereby eliminating the possibility 
of a secondary market.  The literature speculates that institutional investors avoided 
purchasing on a secondary market for fear that they would become victims of adverse 
selection, since the only sellers would be more knowledgeable owners who believed the 
securities were overpriced.  It seemed safer to purchase on the primary market when 
many other institutions were purchasing simultaneously and where the seller was a repeat 
player.63  There is little evidence to suggest that the lower-rated tranches of bespoke 
CDOs were more liquid than the senior tranches, and the analogy of low-rated RMBS 
bonds suggests that they were most likely even less liquid, were it not for the fact that 
AAA CDOs were themselves illiquid.  
Why did institutional investors of all sorts purchase AAA-rated bonds backed by 
mezzanine CDO entities?  Perhaps the best answer is that the institutional buyers 
understood these bonds to be safe—to have the same risk characteristics as AAA 
corporate bonds, for example.  Andrew Lo quotes a 2006 story in the Financial Times in 
which the European head of structured products at Fortis Investments was asked to 
explain the enormous growth in CDO bond issues during 2005.64  The explanation he 
offered was simple: “You buy a AA-rated corporate bond you get paid Libor plus 20 
basis points; you buy a AA-rated CDO and you get Libor plus 110 basis points.”65  As Lo 
                                                
 
62 See Martin Scheicher, How Has CDO Market Pricing Changed During the Turmoil? Evidence From 
CDS Index Tranches 5 (Eur. Cent. Bank Working Paper Series, No. 910, 2008), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=1147094. 
63 See Guillaume Plantin, Learning by Holding and Liquidity, 76 Rev. Econ. Stud. 395, 395 (2009).  
64 Andrew W. Lo, Reading About the Financial Crisis: A Twenty-One-Book Review, 50 J. Econ. Literature 
151, 152 n.4 (2012).   
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37 
 
notes with some irony, no hide-bound believer in the ECMH would have made such an 
assumption.66  The takeaway is that the majority of the managers of the institutional 
buyers of CDOs either believed rating-agency evaluations of risk and trusted the storied 
reputations of underwriters such as Goldman Sacks or, alternatively, they knew that they 
would not be penalized for acting as if they believed this to be so.  Thus, purchasing a 
super-safe tranche of an ABS CDO was a no-brainer—more yield, lower risk, and no 
blame.  Institutional buyers did not attempt to independently value the securities they 
purchased.  Doing so would have required capabilities that few of them possessed.  Like 
a handful of other asset classes such as Federal Reserve Notes, AAA CDO bonds were 
considered to be extraordinarily safe, safer even than similarly-rated corporate bonds.  In 
the post-Crisis vocabulary, these bonds were considered so safe that they were 
“information-insensitive”— meaning that they were near substitutes for Treasury Bills 
and cash, (almost) without risk, and therefore acceptable as efficient collateral in 
financial transactions.67  They were routinely used as such in the short-term money 
market and were treated favorably as bank capital by the Basel II Accord.68  In fact, 
demand for super safe AAA CDO bonds seems to have exceeded supply, a market 
condition that Gary Gorton conjectures led to a parallel explosion of “synthetic” CDOs in 
2005 and 2006.69  
                                                
 
66 See id. at 152. 
67 See Gary B. Gorton, Stefan Lewellen & Andrew Metrick, The Safe-Asset Share 1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. 
Research Working Paper No. 17777, 2012), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w17777. 
68 See Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, International Convergence of Capital Measurement and 
Capital Standards: A Revised Framework 104, 107 (2006), available at 
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69 Gorton, supra note 57, at 28–29.  Exposure to BBB-rated subprime RMBS was 160% of issues 
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Inevitably, the introduction of CDOs into the mortgage-backed securities market 
led to the introduction of CDS protection of CDOs—and in the case of synthetic CDOs, 
CDSs and CDOs were born simultaneously.  Both derivative securities referenced the 
same large set of underlying mortgage pools and shifted cash flows to one another as if 
CDOs had actually purchased the reference cash assets.  But standard CDS contracts and 
indices, while they existed,70 played a much smaller role in the CDO market than they did 
in the RMBS market.  Apart from the fact that the Crisis left the CDO market little time 
to evolve, the likely reasons were that CDOs were enormously more complex, difficult to 
value, and illiquid than were pools of RMBS bonds.71  Bespoke CDS protection on 
individual CDO tranches of bonds was written either by the CDO managers themselves 
or by a few large institutions, such as AIG, Lehman Brothers, and monoline insurers.  
And it was famously purchased by a small number of investors who wished to short the 
market, as well as by larger numbers of banks that retained AAA CDO bonds and wished 
to limit their exposure to asset-backed security risk.72  
The wide-spread perception prior to mid-2007 that AAA CDOs were “supersafe” 
was of course incorrect, at least for mezzanine CDOs.  Should we have expected the 
CDO market to have discovered this fact on its own before the Crisis?  The short answer 
                                                                                                                                            
 
dollar value, 37.5% of mezzanine CDOs issued in 2005 and 48.2% of those issued in 2006 were synthetic 
CDOs.  Overall, about 25% of all CDOs issued between 2004 and 2007 were synthetic. 
70 E.g., Lewis, supra note 46, at 130.  Note that the standardized CDS contract on CDOs entered the market 
almost exactly one year after the standard CDS contract on RMBS.  See Gorton, supra note 57 and 
accompanying text. 
71 For an excellent account of the complexity of structured instruments in the mortgage-backed securities 
market, see Kathryn Judge, Fragmentation Nodes: A Study in Financial Innovation, Complexity, and 
Systemic Risk, 64 Stan. L. Rev. 657 (2012).  For an argument based on experimental evidence that 
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et al., Trading Complex Assets, 68 J. Fin. 1937 (2013).  The authors observe that complexity reduces the 
quality of prices not merely by increasing information costs to traders but also by altering bidding strategies 
and making investors less likely to trade.  Id. 1937.   
72 See Lewis, supra note 46, at 77; Wallace, supra note 49, at 2–3. 
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is no.  As a primary market with very little active trading, the CDO market was simply 
not structured in a way that facilitated arbitrage before the Crisis struck. 
Did institutional purchasers evidence naiveté or cognitive bias by accepting the 
prices that underwriters offered without seeking independent valuations?  Ex post one can 
see warning signs that might have led to greater caution.  By mid-2005, the Bank for 
International Settlements had already warned of potential problems in underwriter 
valuation models—especially of the danger of high correlations among portfolio assets—
and against putting too much faith in the rating agencies.73  It seems more plausible, 
however, that institutional investors rationally relied on the reputations and models of the 
rating agencies and the major banks that served as underwriters.  Asset-backed CDOs had 
performed well in years immediately preceding the Crisis, and AAA-rated bonds, even 
from mezzanine subprime CDOs, were widely accepted in the market as virtually riskless 
securities.  Indeed, they were better than that—these were AAA-rated bonds that paid a 
premium return relative to other securities thought to be super safe.74 
Did the underwriters of subprime AAA CDOs—and the agencies that rated these 
bonds—deliberately mislead their institutional buyers about the risk involved?  Certainly 
there is evidence that rating agencies gradually relaxed their standards for rating these 
securities from 2004 to 2006.  And there is evidence that the quality of subprime CDOs 
declined as well, both in the quality of individual subprime mortgages and in the 
                                                
 
73 See, e.g., Bank for International Settlements, The Joint Forum: Credit Risk Transfer 24–29 (2005), 
available at http://www.bis.org/publ/joint13.htm.  A subsequent revision of this report, published in 2008, 
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percentages of subprime mortgages in CDO portfolios.  Moreover, underwriters often 
withheld information from the purchasers of CDO-backed bonds that might have been 
considered material—the most infamous example being the case of the ABACUS CDO, 
in which a hedge fund helped to select the reference RMBS for a synthetic CDO that 
Goldman Sachs underwrote, and then promptly shorted the CDO once its bonds had been 
placed.75  On the other hand, there is also evidence of rating agencies and CDO 
underwriters acting in good faith.  Many large banks added a portion of the super-safe tier 
of the CDO bonds that they underwrote to their core capital, a decision that cost them 
dearly during the Subprime Crisis.  The valuation models employed by the banks and the 
rating agencies failed for reasons that are obvious in retrospect but were not obvious at 
the time, such as the use of historical housing price data to estimate the future 
performance of CDO portfolios.  But whatever their intentions, there is no question that 
banks and rating agencies performed poorly as informational intermediaries, with the 
effect of juicing the institutional investor market for senior subprime CDO securities.  
There were massive frictions and informational asymmetries in the market for these 
securities.  The question is: What do these imperfections imply for the ECMH? 
The answer is “not much” for a modestly sized ECMH.  Again, senior subprime-
backed CDO bonds were issued in a primary market and were not traded in a secondary 
market.  As Gorton stresses, “over-the-counter markets seem to aggregate information 
                                                
 
75 Press Release, U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges Goldman Sachs with Fraud in Structuring and 
Marketing of CDO Tied to Subprime Mortgages (Apr. 16, 2010), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-59.htm.  See also Jesse Eisinger, supra note 56 (evidence that 
Morgan Stanley among other banks also short their own CDOs). 
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very differently than in stock markets.”76  The claim that market prices are 
informationally efficient requires astute traders to seek profit by trading on new 
information.  The assumption of active trading underlies all of the efficiency mechanisms 
that aggregate information into price.  A primary market without an aftermarket simply 
lacks the structure to converge on efficient prices.  
C. The Stock Market and Publicly-Traded Financial Institutions  
 The last market one might have expected to play an important role in the 
Subprime Crisis was the stock market.  After all, most underwriters of CDOs were 
publicly traded banks, the largest independent originators and securitizers of mortgages—
such as Countrywide Financial Corporation—were publicly traded, and the few large 
financial institutions that sold CDS insurance on CDO bonds—such as AIG, Lehman 
Brothers and the monoline insurer, Ambac Financial Group—were also publicly traded.  
In general, however, the stock market appears to have been a latecomer rather than a 
leader in recognizing signs of the onset of the Subprime Crisis.  Why didn’t share prices 
reflect deterioration in the quality of CDO securities, agency ratings, and quality of 
mortgages well before the Subprime Crisis was in full throat?   
 Once again, the most plausible answer is that obtaining and interpreting 
information about prices was not easy for traders in the equities markets.77  To begin, the 
                                                
 
76 Gorton, supra note 56, at 207. 
77 See generally Robert P. Bartlett, III, Inefficiencies in the Information Thicket: A Case Study of 
Derivative Disclosures During the Financial Crisis, 36 J. Corp. L. 1 (2010); Hill, supra note 74.  Bartlett 
finds evidence inconsistent with the ECMH in a case study of the share price movements of the Ambec 
Financial Group (Ambec), a widely held monoline insurance company with heavy exposure to twenty-eight 
CDOs.  While Bartlett’s study is not easily summarized, its principal findings include the observations that 
Ambec share prices exhibited proportionately negative abnormal returns when the credit rating agencies 
downgraded the bonds of a company it had insured by several steps prior to the Subprime Crisis.  In 
contrast, however, Ambec’s share prices failed to respond significantly to even larger multistep 
 
 
 
42 
 
senior tranches of bespoke CDOs—together with CDS protection on the other side of the 
bet—were extremely difficult to value.  In addition, the business activities of giant banks 
and financial institutions such as AIG are diverse, and financial statements do not 
necessarily segregate their activities.  Further, CDO bonds were unlikely to be “marked 
to market” given their lack of liquidity and were sometimes carried off-the-books 
entirely.78  To be sure, some evidence of uneasiness was reflected in the behavior of some 
big banks.  Morgan Stanley, Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank, and eventually Goldman 
Sachs were worried enough to wind down their CDO operations and to short or hedge the 
CDOs that remained in their warehouses in 2005 and in the first half of 2006.79  
However, such strategic maneuvering was unlikely to be visible to shareholders, and 
                                                                                                                                            
 
downgrades of six of its twenty-eight CDOs, even though Ambec’s aggregate exposure on its CDSs far 
exceeded its financial exposure on the downgraded corporate bonds that it had previously insured.  In 
addition, Ambec’s share prices fell significantly when Ambec itself announced, inter alia, sharp reductions 
in book value due to growing liability from its CDSs, or sharp decreases in its quarterly income—both 
pieces of bad news that predictably paralleled the earlier rating downgrades of the CDOs “insured” by 
Ambec’s CDSs.  Bartlett acknowledges that share prices might already discount for the bad news reflected 
by rating downgrades—the explanation that we would find more intuitive.  Nevertheless, he rejects this 
explanation, in part because of the market’s seeming failure to respond to the bad news already implicit in 
rating downgrades until poor earnings or asset write-downs make it too obvious overlook.  Bartlett 
expresses his point in terms of “salience,” i.e., the hypothesis that even savvy investors may overlook new 
information with large valuation consequences if it does not appear salient at first glance.  Newspaper 
coverage or issuer disclosure may make information salient, and therefore worthy of additional analysis, 
when arbitrageurs might otherwise ignore it, simply because their time and attention are limited resources.  
Putting aside event studies, we agree that the salience hypothesis is plausible.  We would reframe it, 
however, not as cognitive bias but as a matter of information costs.  Thus the cost of learning bad news 
quickly enough to act on it may be high, but it becomes slightly lower on an ex ante basis if newspaper 
coverage or issuer disclosure make arbitrageurs more likely to notice it.  Regarded this way, salience is a 
matter of probability-discounted cost rather than of cognitive bias.  In this sense, the distinction is similar to 
that between behavioral and rational accounts of herding.  See supra note 86 and accompanying text. 
78 See infra note 140 and accompanying text for discussion of accounting valuation of mortgage-backed 
securities; see also Bartlett, supra note 77, at 6–7 (identifying two circumstances when, because of 
particular regulators’ requirements covering monoline insurers, the insurer’s exposure to CDOs and CDSs 
could, with difficulty, be roughly observed).  Bartlett also recounts the very large costs associated with the 
effort.   
79 See Tristana Moore, Deutsche Bank Boss Dodges Crisis, BBC News (Feb. 8, 2008), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/7234292.stm; Neil Unmack & Sebastian Boyd, CDO Losses May Be 
$52 Billion, Credit Suisse Says, Bloomberg (July 9, 2007), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aPKIHSk5cS50&refer=home. 
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many other institutions of similar size and reputation seemed unconcerned during this 
period.  Again, the only markets in which prices may have anticipated the coming 
Subprime Crisis were the ABX BBB and BBB- subprime indices, as we discuss briefly 
below.  Even the Chicago Mercantile Exchange in three-month housing futures exhibited 
“relative stability in market expectations until a decline in the fourth quarter of 2007 and 
then a precipitous drop at the very end of 2007 and beginning of 2008.”80  
 Thus, the evidence is that most astute investors did not anticipate a steep drop in 
housing prices immediately prior to its occurrence, whether or not they believed in an 
enormous bubble in housing prices.  This outcome is entirely consistent with the ECMH, 
which maintains that prices in a relatively efficient market will respond rapidly to new 
public information, but does not maintain the converse proposition—namely, that every 
sharp turn in market prices can be traced to identifiable fresh public information.  Nor, of 
course, does the ECMH permit information to enter the market that fixes the time of 
future collapse in prices, since such information cannot exist without immediately 
causing the collapse it predicts.  
 D.   A Note on Behavioral Finance 
If the market behavior accompanying the Subprime Crisis is consistent with the 
ECMH, can the same be said about its compatibility with hypotheses rooted in behavioral 
finance?  In an earlier article, we discussed the variety of behavioral hypothesis biases 
that might plausibly interfere with rational pricing based on public information.81  Much 
                                                
 
80 Allen Ferrell & Atanu Saha, Securities Litigation and the Housing Market Downturn, 35 J. Corp. L. 97, 
115 (2009). 
81 See Gilson & Kraakman, Hindsight, supra note 39, at 736–42.  In that Article we acknowledged that an 
analysis based in part on the cognitive biases of noise traders, as described in the text below, very plausibly 
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of this important literature derives from work by the cognitive psychologists Daniel 
Kahneman and Amos Tversky, who use experiments to show how common cognitive 
biases lead individuals to systematically mis-assess value.82  We will not review our 
earlier discussion here, much less the additional progress made in behavioral finance 
since our intervention.  We do not doubt, for example, that the failure of CDO purchasers 
to correctly assess the riskiness of these assets is consistent with a theory of cognitive 
bias.   
                                                                                                                                            
 
contributed to the dot.com bubble and subsequent crash of 1999-2001.  There, however, we emphasized the 
institutional half of the story.  To be sure, noise traders with systematic cognitive biases can distort prices 
even in very actively traded markets in public equities, but they can only do so occasionally when activity 
by noise traders is so intense that it short-circuits the arbitrage mechanism, and savvy traders become 
unable or unwilling to police prices.  See, e.g., Andrei Shleifer, Inefficient Markets: An Introduction to 
Behavioral Finance 24 (2000). Arbitraging against the sentiment of oblivious noise traders is very risky.  It 
may be more profitable to trade into the bubble they create in the hope of making a quick escape before it 
bursts.  Low cost arbitrage also requires infrastructure such as standardized CDS contracts and the ABX 
indices.  Moreover, other frictions arise when arbitrageurs trade with other people’s money because outside 
investors do not know whether a bad trade reflects bad judgment or only bad luck, and may therefore lose 
their appetite for more investment.  Therefore arbitrageurs have an incentive to be conservative when 
trading with other people’s money.  In contrast to our earlier article dealing with the dot.com crisis, 
however, we argue below that cognitive bias is less likely to have played an central role in the Sub-Prime 
Crisis where all almost all investors were institutions, savvy intermediaries, and professional traders.  
While some commentators argue that such professional investors are also subject to “distorted beliefs,” it is 
very hard to distinguish this notion with its overtone of cognitive impairment from entirely rational 
behavior under circumstances of costly information and moral hazard created by informational 
intermediaries.  Economists working in the tradition of behavior finance recognize the distinction between 
noise traders that might have played an important role in the dot.com bubble and the sober-minded 
institutional investors collectively responsible for the Sub-Prime Crisis.   Brock Mendel and Andre 
Shleifer, for example, offer a clever model of the Crisis in which even small numbers of noise traders might 
mislead the vast majority of sober-minded investors who are attempting to decode price signals.  See Brock 
Mendel & Andre Shleifer, Chasing Noise, 104 J. Fin. Econ. 303-320 (2012).  But from our perspective, 
their model is less about irrational trading than about high information costs that lead investors to rationally 
misinterpret price signals. 
82 For a collection of their early work, see Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Judgment Under 
Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases (Daniel Kahneman, et al. eds., 1982).  Nicholas Barberis & Richard 
Thaler, A Survey of Behavioral Finance, in 1 Handbook of the Economics of Finance 1053 (G. 
Constantinides et al. eds., 2003) and David Hirshleifer, Investor Psychology and Asset Pricing, 56 J. Fin. 
1533, 1563–76 (2001) provide recent finance-oriented surveys.  Daniel Kahneman’s receipt of the 2002 
Nobel Prize in Economics for this body of work is dramatic evidence of these psychologists’ impact on 
economics.  Because of his untimely death, Amos Tversky was not eligible to share in the Nobel Prize 
award.    
 
 
45 
 
Instead we make a different point, one that goes to the plausibility rather than to 
the consistency of market frictions as the chief culprits in the Subprime Crisis.  
Unsophisticated investors—noise traders rather than institutional investors—are usually 
depicted as more vulnerable to cognitive biases, and therefore more likely than 
professional investors to distort market prices.  Charles M.C. Lee, Andrei Shleifer, and 
Richard Thaler’s clever effort to explain the discount often associated with closed-end 
mutual funds—one of the long-standing phenomena that conflicts with the implications 
of the ECMH—aptly illustrates the potential for such misguided investors to influence 
price efficiency.83  When an investor sells shares in a closed-end mutual fund, she 
receives what a buyer is willing to pay, rather than a proportionate share of the fund’s net 
asset value.  Because the net asset value of a closed-end fund is observable, the ECMH 
predicts that fund’s stock price will reflect this value.  In fact, closed-end funds 
systematically (but not uniformly) trade at discounts from their net asset values—a 
longstanding “puzzle” for the ECMH is that stock prices often diverge from asset values 
in the one case in which these underlying values are observable.84   
 However, noise trading has limited explanatory power in the layered markets that 
gave rise to the Subprime Crisis.  The closest analogues to noise traders during the 
                                                
 
83 Charles M.C. Lee, Andrei Shleifer, & Richard Thaler, Investment Sentiment and the Closed-End Fund 
Puzzle, 46 J. Fin. 75 (1991).  For the heated debate over econometrics to which this article gave rise, see 
Nai-fu Chen, Raymond Kan & Merton Miller, Are the Discounts on Closed-End Funds a Sentiment Index?, 
48 J. Fin. 795 (1993); Navin Chopra et al., Yes, Discounts on Closed-End Funds are a Sentiment Index, 48 
J. Fin. 801 (1993); Nai-fu Chen, Raymond Kan & Merton Miller, A Rejoinder, 48 J. Fin. 809 (1993).  
Zingales refers to the closed-end mutual fund phenomenon in his recent account of the challenges to the 
ECMH.  See Zingales, supra note 11, at 33–36. 
84 See Reinier Kraakman, Taking Discounts Seriously: The Implications of "Discounted" Share Prices as an 
Acquisition Motive, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 891, 892 (1988).  But even here, the absence of a valuation model 
makes a difference: for example, shares in closed-end equity funds are frequently less liquid than the 
widely traded securities that these funds hold.  Could liquidity risk be part of the valuation model? 
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Subprime Crisis were the house flippers and unfortunate homebuyers who agreed to 
mortgages they couldn’t afford.85  For reasons developed earlier,86 housing prices were 
unlikely to have reflected the full costs of default risks and liars with any modicum of 
relative efficiency.  At the other end of the CDO production chain, institutional investors 
purchased AAA CDO bonds in a primary market without real trading to aggregate price-
relevant information.  Such trading happened only in the intermediate markets in RMBS 
and their derivatives.  These markets clearly were sensitive to new information bubbling 
up from the housing market and, in retrospect, plausibly predicted price movements in 
the other markets as well.  Figure 1 below shows prices of the first and second vintages of 
ABX BBB- indices issued on July 1, 2005 and January 1, 2006.87  As the graph suggests, 
the second vintage 2006 of BBB- subprime bonds (ABX.HE.BBB-06-2) fell into decline 
just five months after trading began and lost twenty percent of its value by March 2007.  
By way of comparison, most commentators date the onset of the Subprime Crisis to July 
or August 2007, when the same index had already lost sixty percent of its value.       
 Note, too, that while some AAA bonds of mezzanine CDOs had lost upwards of 
fifty percent of their value by end of 2007, the senior tranches of RMBS bonds retained 
almost all of their value.     
                                                
 
85 See Hill, supra note 74, at 51–52, for a plausible case that these borrowers made fully rational decisions 
in buying homes they could not afford with money borrowed—at least for the teaser period—at greatly 
below market interest rates. 
86 See Wallace, supra note 49, at 44. 
87 Figure 1 is taken from Gorton, supra note 51, at 5. 
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Source: Gary Gorton, Information, Liquidity, and the (Ongoing) Panic of 2007 4 (NBER Working Paper 
Series 14649, 2009), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w14649. 
 
 The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report reveals that twelve out of America’s thirteen 
most important financial institutions were at risk of failure during 2008, while “[o]verall, 
for 2005 to 2007 vintage tranches of mortgage-backed securities [i.e., RMBS] originally 
rated triple-A . . . only about 10% of [these bonds issued by Alt-A mortgage pools88] and 
4% of [AAA bonds issued by subprime mortgage pools] had been ‘materially 
impaired’—meaning that losses were imminent or had already been suffered—by the end 
of 2009.”89  This was not a bad record.  Unfortunately, it extended only to senior bonds in 
the single Crisis-related market where shorting was cheap and sophisticated players 
                                                
 
88 Alt-A mortgages were those otherwise hard to classify and included a large portion of the so-called liar 
loans, where borrowed claims about critical information such as income and outstanding debt were 
accepted at face value with verification requirements. 
89 Fin. Crisis Inquiry Comm’n, Financial Crisis Inquiry Report 228–29 (2011), available at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf. 
	  
	  
Figure 1: ABX BBB- Subindex Prices 
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traded actively.  Without the emergence of CDOs to absorb the junior RMBS bonds, new 
issuances of RMBS might have declined, and the Subprime Crisis might have been 
contained.   
IV.  The Policy Implications of a Post-Crisis ECMH 
 As we suggested in Part I, a skeptic may dismiss our defense of a modest ECMH 
in the wake of the Subprime Crisis.  Of what policy value is a hypothesis that fails to give 
strong proactive advice on how to prevent asset bubbles—the market phenomenon at the 
heart of the crisis?  In response, we have argued that the ECMH, properly understood, 
can help to locate and reduce market frictions even if it cannot prevent market bubbles.  
A modest ECMH can be a diagnostic tool for exploring how closely real markets 
approximate the frictionless ideal.  In addition, it may also guide us, if we are very smart, 
in improving the institutions that contribute to the informational efficiency of market 
prices, which in turn may help mitigate the effect of bubbles. 
 This Part tentatively describes how a modest ECMH can inform regulatory 
strategy.  Our ambition is purely illustrative.  For us, the most important lesson that both 
the Internet bubble and the Subprime Crisis teach is the extraordinary sensitivity of 
markets to the frictions that impede information from informing prices, be these frictions 
the agency costs of using informational intermediaries, the limitations of certain market 
structures, or the sheer cost of acquiring information about complex and opaque market 
instruments and successfully evaluating them.   
 Further, we argue that increasing the relative efficiency of market prices 
complements the effectiveness of regulation.  Well-designed regulation should seek to 
increase price transparency, while greater transparency in turn should facilitate regulatory 
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effectiveness.  In this virtuous circle, greater relative efficiency of asset prices can reveal 
the success of regulatory intervention—or reveal the failure of disingenuous regulation 
that stems from the negative impact of public sector agency problems on the relative 
efficiency of market prices.90 
 We illustrate the interaction between markets and regulation by discussing two 
categories of regulatory responses to the Subprime Crisis, each of which corresponds to a 
pillar of the ECMH: (1) regulation that affects information costs, and (2) regulation that 
affects the market’s capacity to aggregate and impound information into price.91  In the 
first category, two regulatory responses to the Crisis seem to move in the right direction: 
the Federal Reserve’s program of stress testing banks and Dodd-Frank’s tentative steps 
toward increasing mandatory disclosure.  A third information-relevant reform that 
surfaced in the Crisis’ wake, however, moved in the wrong direction.  This was the 
(temporary) decision of the Financial Standards Accounting Board (“FSAB”) to allow 
financial institutions to relax fair-value accounting standards in valuing financial assets.   
 With respect to the second pillar of the ECMH, we describe interventions that 
might encourage information aggregation (through trading and short selling) and address 
structural reforms intended to increase the visibility of price and trading volume 
information to traders and market regulators alike.  Here, however, we remain agnostic 
about possible reforms, as befits our limited knowledge about the structure at issue.     
                                                
 
90 This argument parallels that made by Jeffrey Gordon with respect to the role and effectiveness of 
independent directors.  In Gordon’s account, the increased information efficiency of stock prices allowed 
independent directors to undertake a much more vigorous monitoring role in corporate governance.  Jeffrey 
Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States, 1950–2005: Of Shareholder Value and 
Stock Market Prices, 59 Stan. L. Rev. 1465, 1541 (2007). 
91 See supra Part III (discussing the role of information costs in determining relative information efficiency 
and summarizing the mechanisms of market efficiency). 
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A. Regulation and Information Costs 
 Appropriately, we begin with post-Crisis regulatory interventions that might 
influence the costs of acquiring, verifying, and valuing information.   
 1.  Expanding Disclosure 
 
Increased mandatory disclosure is the simplest response to market failure that 
turns on information costs.  Disclosure was inadequate within and across all markets 
implicated in the Crisis: from homebuyers to lenders, from mortgage originators to 
securitizers, from the issuers of RMBS bonds to the RMBS market, from the sponsors 
and underwriters of RMBS CDOs to the rating agencies, and most importantly, from 
CDO underwriters and rating agencies to the ultimate institutional purchasers of CDO 
AAA bonds.  One of several examples emerges from an empirical study undertaken by 
the Committee on Capital Markets, which found that only some RMBS issuers provided 
granular level disclosure about the mortgages behind particular securitizations, and even 
these issuers failed to include more than a third of the data considered “essential” by 
more than eighty percent of the sample of institutional buyers of RMBS-backed bonds.92  
Disclosure of dynamic loan-level information prior to the Subprime Crisis was even more 
scarce.93   
At the opposite end of the CDO assembly line, disclosure about the assets 
underlying AAA CDOs was still less forthcoming.  Each bespoke CDO included bonds 
                                                
 
92 Committee on Capital Markets, The Global Financial Crisis: A Plan for Regulatory Reform 146–48 
(2009). 
93 Id. at 148–50 (reporting that the data available are so voluminous that the database from a single third-
party provider contains upwards of one billion rows of data).  Scott Peppet, Smart Mortgages, Privacy and 
the Regulatory Possibility of Infomediation 11 (Univ. of Colo. Law Legal Studies Research, Working 
Paper No. 09–13, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1458064, provides a helpful survey of 
information problems confronting investors in mortgage-backed securities and derivatives. 
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backed by different tranches of numerous RMBOs and even other CDOs.  The pooled 
cash flows from these motley assets were then re-divided (or “restructured”) into the 
CDO’s unique scheme of tranches, which governed the “waterfall” of cash flows to its 
numbered tranches of bonds according to its own complex timing and distribution rules.  
There was seniority among tranches of course, but it was often quirky seniority arising 
from the over-collaterization of some tranches and similar modifications.  To further 
complicate matters, CDO managers actively bought and sold portfolio assets within 
specified limits.  As the number of tranches and the variety of CDO assets grew, the 
information required for a thorough valuation also grew exponentially. 94  Remember too 
that CDO managers actively bought new assets and sold old ones.  From the perspective 
of the institutional purchases of CDO-backed bonds, the prospect of actually valuing 
these bonds from the ground up ranged from impossible to “merely” extraordinarily 
difficult. 95  But this question was largely moot since “few investors [in CDO bonds] 
actually went to the trouble [of attempting to analyze them].”96  
                                                
 
94 John B. Taylor, Getting Off Track: How Government Actions and Interventions Caused, Prolonged, and 
Worsened the Financial Crisis 13 (2009); Gorton, supra note 51, at 45, 49.  Bartlett, supra note 77, at 44, 
recounts efforts by one hedge fund to evaluate two monoline insurers’ exposure to CDOs.  Even though the 
two insurers had only twenty-eight and thirty direct exposures, after drilling down, the hedge fund 
determined that each insurer was exposed to over 3,000 unique tranches of MBS and over 400 CDOs. Id. at 
44. 
95 Committee on Capital Markets, supra note 92, at 150.  Robert Bartlett’s case study of Pershing Square’s 
efforts to short two monoline insurers because of their CDO exposure illustrates the point.  Pershing Square 
went to a great deal of effort to develop an “open source” computer model that valued the insurers’ CDO 
exposure and wrote a number of research reports explaining Pershing Square’s negative assessment (and its 
short position on the insurers’ stock).  Nonetheless, Pershing Square’s model, available to others, and its 
reports, which proved ex post to be far more accurate than the market’s valuation as reflected in the 
insurers’ stock price, failed to trigger widespread shorting of the insurers’ stock by professional investors, 
the drivers of the professionally-informed trading mechanism.  Bartlett, supra note 77, at 42–48.  For our 
purposes, the central point is that Pershing Square’s model was disputed by the insurers, Bartlett, supra note 
77, at 6–7, was inconsistent with the market, and would have been very difficult and expensive for any 
other potential arbitrageur to confirm by replicating the model independently.  In that circumstance, we 
would expect the Pershing Square information to be reflected in price only slowly—relatively 
inefficiently—as the market gradually acquires new information that confirms the general accuracy of the 
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The story of the Subprime Crisis wound down as the real estate market collapsed 
and the last CDO bonds were placed at the end of 2007.  As AAA CDO bonds came to be 
perceived as risky, other securitized assets did as well.  By 2008, no one would buy CDO 
or even RMBS bonds on the OTC market because no one knew their value.  Moreover, 
the many banks and other financial institutions holding CDOs and RMBOs were forced 
to write down the value of these assets.  Further, collateral calls by CDS holders on CDS 
writers forced fire sales and additional write-downs of CDOs, ultimately forcing AIG into 
government ownership and Lehman Brothers into bankruptcy.  And so the Subprime 
Crisis morphed into the broader Financial Crisis.  As Nobel laureate Harry Markowitz 
wrote, “These [AAA CDO] instruments caused an information crisis in which parties 
refused to enter into transactions with each other whenever doing so involved 
counterparty risk because no one knew who held bad paper.”97  
So much for the diagnosis.  What about the treatment?  From the standpoint of 
acquiring and verifying information, the ideal treatment might be to assign each mortgage 
and the RMBS portfolio a unique number that would allow investors at each market level 
to track the performance of these assets, even when portfolios are updated and assets are 
                                                                                                                                            
 
Pershing Square model.  Pershing Square plainly was trying to engage the professionally-informed trading 
mechanism by making its model available to all; however, it underestimated the costs of confirming the 
model’s credibility.  This is consistent with the information-based barriers to the adoption of new and 
innovative trading instruments; it takes time for the market to understand and determine the appropriate 
valuation model.  See Gilson & Kraakman, Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, supra note 9, at 585; Awrey, 
supra note 4, at 43 (“[N]ewer and more innovative financial instruments invariably demand the incursion of 
high (initial) costs on the part of both market participants and regulators.”). 
96 Committee on Capital Markets, supra note 92, at 150. 
97 Harry M. Markowitz, Proposals Concerning the Current Financial Crisis, Fin. Analysts J., Jan./Feb. 
2009, at 25.  See Matthew Pritsker, Informational Easing: Improving Credit Conditions Through the 
Release of Information, 16 Fed. Res. Bank of N.Y. Econ. Pol’y Rev. 77, 82 (2010) (“Interbank spreads 
increased appreciably because of uncertainty over which banks were exposed to housing—and especially 
uncertainty over which banks were exposed to subprime loans.”). 
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bought and sold.  The addition of mandatory programs to the waterfalls of cash through 
the tranches of CDO and RMBS might be necessary as well. 98 
But would such a registration regime be worth the candle?  There is an enormous 
political roadblock.  A half dozen federal agencies and the private sector would have to 
cooperate to implement such a thorough disclosure regime.  For example, the SEC is 
responsible under the Securities Act of 1933 for disclosures concerning publicly offered 
instruments in securitized pools, as well as private offerings of such securities, and the 
circumstances under which periodic reporting under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
can be terminated with respect to previously registered securitization instruments.99  The 
FASB is responsible for the accounting rules that govern when banks must consolidate 
securitizations for purposes of their financial statements and, it follows, for purposes of 
disclosure under SEC rules.  The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation is responsible 
for regulating the terms of, and disclosure concerning, securitizations undertaken by 
insured institutions, including consolidation policy for purposes of regulatory review.  In 
                                                
 
98 For useful accounts of the distribution of regulatory authority, see Peppet, supra note 93, at 45–56, and 
Howell E. Jackson, Loan-Level Disclosure in Securitization Transactions: A Problem with Three 
Dimensions 5–19 (Harvard Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Series, Paper No. 10–40, 
2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1649657. 
99Among other Dodd-Frank sections, §§ 942(a) and (b) address these issues.  Dodd-Frank § 942(a) 
established an ongoing reporting obligation for issuers of all ABS classes for which a registration statement 
has become effective pursuant to the Securities Act, and it also allowed the SEC to propose rules providing 
for the suspension of this duty to file for any class of ABS.  Effective September 22, 2011, the SEC 
adopted rules to provide thresholds for suspension of the reporting requirements for ABS issuers and also 
amended rules relating to the Exchange Act reporting requirements of ABS issuers.  For example, amended 
Exchange Act Rule 15d–22(b) provides for suspension of reporting obligations for ABS classes in certain 
circumstances. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.15d–22 (2013).  For more detail on the final rule changes, see 
Suspension of the Duty to File Reports for Classes of Asset-Backed Securities Under Section 15(D) of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 76 Fed. Reg. 52549, 52549 (Aug. 23, 2011). Dodd-Frank § 942(b) adds 
§ 7(c) to the Securities Act to require ABS issuers to disclose certain loan-level information for the assets 
backing the security for each tranche or class of security.  The SEC was tasked with setting standards for 
the format of data to be provided and with requiring issuers to disclose asset-level or loan-level data.  On 
July 26, 2011 the SEC re-proposed rules requiring this asset-level information, but currently final rules 
have not been put forth. See Re-Proposed Rule: Re-Proposal of Shelf Eligibility Conditions for Asset-
Backed Securities, 76 Fed. Reg. 47948, 47948 (proposed Aug. 5, 2011). 
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the private sector, the American Securitization Forum, a trade group, has proposed 
disclosure reforms through its Project Restart,100 which would specify loan-level 
disclosure and computer-based mechanisms through which this could be traced through 
fragmentation levels, dramatically reducing the costs of acquiring the information 
necessary to value MBSs, CDOs and CDSs.  Thus, multi-party regulatory and voluntary 
efforts to improve disclosure must demonstrate considerable promise to overcome their 
political costs.  
Demonstrating such promise is both practically and conceptually difficult.  As we 
have noted before, the fact that AAA bonds backed by mezzanine CDOs were perceived 
as “information insensitive” was at the core of the Subprime Crisis.  Buyers accepted low 
returns on these bonds because they were presumptively (almost) risk-free assets.  As 
Jean Tirole’s recent survey of the literature on illiquidity indicates, there is a tradeoff 
between returns and the informational demands of fixed income securities.101  
Purportedly safe securities pay low returns precisely because their buyers need not do due 
diligence beyond reviewing the grades assigned by the rating agencies, that is, third 
parties assumed to be credible informational intermediaries.102  But Dang, Gorton, and 
Holmstrom show that if subsequent bad news undermines the credibility of the credit 
raters, the jig is up. 103  Rated securities suddenly become information sensitive, leading 
to one of three results: their prices drop far enough to restore absolute belief in their 
                                                
 
100 ASF Project Restart, http://www.americansecuritization.com/Issues.aspx?taxid=2188 (last visited May 
3, 2013). 
101 See Jean Tirole, Illiquidity and All Its Friends, 49 J. Econ. Literature 287, 302–03 (2011). 
102 Id. at 302. 
103 See Vi Tri Dang, Gary B. Gorton & Bengt Holstrom, Ignorance, Debt, and Financial Crises 2–3 (Mar. 
11, 2013) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author), available at 
http://www.columbia.edu/~td2332/Paper_Ignorance.pdf. 
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safety; their buyers acquire valuation skills; or they eventually no longer have buyers and 
become completely illiquid.  Dang, et al. conclude that when there is gross failure of 
informational intermediaries to anticipate bad news “[t]he shock is amplified, leading to a 
crisis.”104  One implication of this analysis is that the former purchasers of CDO AAA 
bonds may not want an elaborate disclosure system to safeguard against misleading or 
inflated credit ratings.  For them, a superior outcome might be increasing the reliability of 
credit rating agencies. 
Dodd-Frank has already taken a step in this direction by mandating that rating 
agencies disclose the principal assumptions behind their models even if some details must 
remain proprietary.105  Once implemented, such disclosure would presumably expose 
rating methodologies to careful scrutiny (and to additional gaming as well).  Another 
reform might be to leverage the reputations of agencies by requiring that they 
periodically report on the aggregate accuracy of their past ratings—a report that might be 
accompanied by a performance-related award or fine.106  We cannot hazard a guess at to 
                                                
 
104 Id. at 3.  
105 On May 18, 2011, the SEC proposed rules containing this requirement. Proposed rule 17 C.F.R. § 
240.15E(s)(1), for example, requires that NRSROs provide, along with any credit rating, a form containing 
information relating to the assumptions underlying the credit rating procedures and methodologies and the 
data that was relied on to determine the credit rating.  As of publication, however, final rules have not been 
promulgated.  See Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations, 76 Fed. Reg. 33420, 33456 
(proposed June 8, 2011). 
106 For a discussion of possible reforms relating to rating agency accuracy, see John C. Coffee, Jr., Ratings 
Reform: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly, 1 Harv. Bus. L. Rev. 231, 246–71 (2011). One potential 
solution—placing the CRA fee in escrow and entitling investors to “clawback” the fee if the rating proved 
is accurate—could address the issue that the accuracy of the rating is determined only over the long run, 
while the fee is paid in the short run.  Id. at 253.  Coffee goes on to consider the merits of using a system 
where the government chooses a CRA to use, as compared to a system where the CRA rotates.  Id. at 256–
58.  Coffee concludes, essentially, that the former “could degenerate into a means for distributing patronage 
and political payoffs” and that the latter would provide no incentive for rating agency accuracy.  Id. at 257–
58.  Finally, Coffee considers the merits of a subscriber-pays model, where institutions would have to 
obtain a credit rating from the CRA of their choosing.  Id. at 256–57, 258–59, 269.  He concludes that this 
model would foster competition and thus put more emphasis on a CRA’s reputation for accuracy, but 
doubts that investors would be willing to pay themselves for a rating.  Id. at 258–59. 
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whether these or other constraints on rating agencies would prove cost effective.  The 
perennial objection is that they could be contracted for if they really were effective, and 
the perennial response is that without experimentation even the market cannot know 
value ex ante.   
A final limitation on disclosure as a regulatory strategy is the sheer complexity of 
some investment instruments.  As capital markets grow more complete, financial 
innovations grow more complex.  The ECMH predicts that the price stability of novel 
securities increases with market experience and improved modeling.  We cannot rule out 
the possibility, however, that the dangers posed by a class of securities cannot be detected 
or easily rectified by their designers soon enough to prevent financial chaos.  In some 
cases, only strong regulatory controls or outright prohibition may do.  If we cannot 
predict (and prevent) earthquakes, we can at least adopt building codes that make a 
human catastrophe less likely. 
2.  Bank Stress Tests  
 
It is widely accepted that the transition from the Subprime Crisis to the Financial 
Crisis occurred with the freezing of the credit markets.  Several things occurred at once.  
The value of senior CDO notes dropped precipitously as they lost their risk-free 
reputation in the market.  Simultaneously, investors and banks realized that little was 
known about how much exposure individual banks carried to the risks associated with 
these assets.107  Banks responded to these epiphanies by sharply reducing lending while 
increasing the collateral they demanded for new loans.  This dramatic decline in bank 
                                                
 
107 “Interbank spreads increased appreciably because of uncertainty over which banks were exposed to 
housing—and especially uncertainty over which banks were exposed to subprime loans.”  Matthew 
Pritsker, supra note 97, at 82.  
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lending—combined with a similar decline in lending in the shadow banking market—led 
to a liquidity crisis.108  Information about the financial conditions of banks remained 
prohibitively costly until the state intervened to assess the financial health of individual 
banks.109  
One part of the Treasury’s Financial Stability package announced in January 2008 
was directed at producing information about the condition of large U.S. banks.  Through 
the Supervisory Capital Assessment Program (“SCAP,” or the “Stress Test”), the 
Treasury required each of the nineteen largest U.S. banks, representing some two-thirds 
of all U.S. bank assets,110 to simultaneously undertake a Treasury-specified assessment of 
the bank’s capital two years into the future under two different scenarios—one baseline 
and one more adverse—in order to identify whether the bank had sufficient capital under 
each.  The methodology of the Stress Test was publicly disclosed so that its credibility 
could be independently evaluated.111  Banks that reported a capital shortfall would be 
required to raise new capital in that amount, which the Treasury would provide if the 
market would not.  Importantly, the Treasury publicly announced the results of the Stress 
Test, and the corresponding determination of capital adequacy.  The Stress Test revealed 
                                                
 
108 “[D]uring the financial crisis of 2007–2009, interbank spreads increased markedly, and lending through 
the interbank market declined.”  Pritsker, supra note 97, at 79.  Gary Gorton stresses that the lack of 
information concerning the assets that underlay mortgage backed securities either held by banks or as to 
which banks had a residual stake contributed importantly to the uncertainty.  Gary Gorton, Slapped by the 
Invisible Hand: The Panic of 2007 62–65 (2010); see also Markowitz, supra note 97, at 25 (“These 
instruments caused an information crisis in which parties refused to enter into transactions with each other 
whenever doing so involved counterparty risk because no one knew who held bad paper.”) 
109 Pritsker, supra note 97, at 82. 
110 Stavros Peristian, Donald P. Morgan & Vanessa Savino, The Information Value of the Stress Test and 
Bank Opacity, Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Reports No. 460, at 4 (July 1, 2010) (unpublished 
manuscript), available at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=1650670. 
111 See Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., The Supervisory Capital Assessment Program: Design 
and Implementation 1–2 (2009), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/bcreg20090424a1.pdf.  
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that ten of the banks had inadequate capital, while nine had sufficient capital.  Of the 
banks that had to raise new capital, the size of the shortfall ranged from $0.6 billion to 
$33.9 billion. 
 From our perspective, the Stress Test resurrected the market in interbank lending 
by generating new information about the credit worthiness of the largest U.S. banks.112  
Of course, the market itself might have generated the same information more cheaply—
but it did not when this information was critical.  A recent paper provides evidence of the 
new information the Stress Test provided.113  Peristian, et al., report the results of an 
event study measuring the stock price response of two categories of the nineteen large 
U.S. banks that were required to conduct the Stress Test: the ten banks that the Stress 
Test revealed needed more capital; and the nine banks whose capital the Stress Test 
showed was adequate.  The stock prices of the nine banks the Stress Test showed to have 
adequate capital experienced no abnormal returns on announcement of the results.  The 
authors interpret this result as consistent with the market previously having identified the 
                                                
 
112 Daniel K. Tarullo, a Federal Reserve Governor, also appears to have been persuaded that the stress tests 
provided new information to the market:  
[B]ecause loan portfolios are inherently difficult to value without a great deal of detailed 
information, increased transparency could be an important addition to the information 
available to investors and counterparties of the largest institutions . . . . The market 
discipline made possible by such means as special resolution mechanisms and contingent 
capital will be most effective if market participants have adequate information with 
which to make informed judgments about the banks.   
Daniel K. Tarullo, Lessons from the Crisis Stress Tests, Remarks at the Federal Reserve Board 
International Research Forum on Monetary Policy 9 (Mar. 26, 2010) (transcript available on the Federal 
Reserve website), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/tarullo20100326a.pdf. 
113 See Peristian, supra note 110, at 1–4.  Other sources provide interview evidence of the value of SCAP 
disclosed information: “A broad set of market indicators also suggest that the public release of SCAP 
results may have helped reduce uncertainty in the financial markets and increased market confidence.”  
U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO–10–861, Bank Stress Test Offers Lessons as Regulators Take 
Further Actions to Strengthen Supervisory Oversight 23 (2010).  
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banks that were adequately capitalized.  For these banks, the Stress Test provided no new 
information.114   
In contrast, the stock prices of the ten banks that the Stress Test showed to require 
significant additional capital experienced significant positive abnormal returns on 
announcement of their capital deficiency.  The authors interpret this as showing that the 
Stress Test credibly informed the market that banks suspected to be weak were stronger 
than had been anticipated.115   
In late 2011, following the SCAP stress tests, the Federal Reserve Board finalized 
a rule requiring U.S. bank holding companies with consolidated assets of $50 billion or 
more to submit annual capital plans for review in a program known as the 
Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review (“CCAR”).116  The stress testing under 
CCAR is conducted annually.  Each bank holding company’s capital plan must include 
detailed descriptions of: “the [holding company’s] processes for assessing capital 
                                                
 
114 Peristian, supra note 110, at 14. 
115 Daniel K. Tarullo, Federal Reserve Governor, made the point directly: 
[T]he [SCAP] results were released at a time when uncertainty about bank conditions 
were very high, and some market participants feared the worst.  That is, perceptions of 
tail risk were very high, and the SCAP results helped reassure market participants that 
under a severe but plausible scenario, the capital needs of the largest U.S. banks were 
manageable. 
Tarullo, supra note 112, at 4–5. Frederic S. Mishkin, another Federal Reserve Governor, reached the same 
conclusion: “The stress tests were a key factor that helped increase the amount of information in the 
marketplace, thereby reducing asymmetric information and adverse selection and moral hazard problems.”  
Frederic S. Mishkin, Over the Cliff: From the Subprime to the Global Financial Crisis, 25 J. Econ. Persp. 
49, 62 (2010).  See also Peristian, supra note 110, at 15. 
116 Press Release, Fed. Reserve Bd. (Nov. 22, 2011), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/20111122a.htm.  In 2012, the CCAR was required 
for the same nineteen bank holding companies that had participated in SCAP, plus twelve additional firms 
with at least $50 billion in assets that had not previously participated in stress testing.  Id.  In 2013, one of 
the nineteen bank holding companies, Metlife, Inc., did not participate because it was in the process of 
deregistering as a bank holding company when the 2013 process began.  Bd. of Governors of the Fed. 
Reserve Sys., Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review 2013: Assessment Framework and Results 9 
n.10 (2013), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/ccar-2013-results-
20130314.pdf. 
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adequacy; the policies governing capital actions such as common stock issuance, 
dividends, and share repurchases; and all planned capital actions over a nine-quarter 
reporting horizon.”117  In addition, each holding company must report to the Federal 
Reserve the results of various stress tests that assess the sources and uses of capital under 
both baseline and stressed economic conditions.118 
The first CCAR results, released on March 13, 2012, were promising.  The stress 
scenario included a peak unemployment rate of thirteen percent, a fifty percent drop in 
equity prices, and a twenty-one percent decline in housing prices, which would result in 
losses at the nineteen bank holding companies totalling $534 billion.119  Despite these 
heavy hypothetical losses, fifteen of the nineteen bank holding companies were estimated 
to maintain capital ratios above the regulatory minimum levels, even when accounting for 
proposed capital actions like dividend increases or share buybacks.120 
An addition to the Federal Reserve’s stress testing regime came in October 2012 
when it finalized the Dodd-Frank stress test, which is similar to but distinct from the 
CCAR capital adequacy test.121  The Dodd-Frank stress test implemented Dodd-Frank 
sections 165(i)(1) and (i)(2), which required both supervisory and company-run stress 
testing over a wider set of institutions than those covered by the CCAR.122  Institutions 
subject to the Dodd-Frank stress test include those bank holding companies with assets of 
$50 billion or more that had participated in SCAP (and who had also participated the 
                                                
 
117 Tarullo, supra note 112, at 3. 
118 Id. 
119 Press Release, Fed. Reserve Bd. (Mar. 13, 2012), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/20120313a.htm. 
120 Id. 
121 Press Release, Fed. Reserve Bd. (Oct. 9, 2012), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/20121009a.htm. 
122 Press Release, Fed. Reserve Bd., supra note 116, at 5. 
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previous year in CCAR), as well as bank holding companies with between $10 billion 
and $50 billion in assets, and state member banks and savings and loan holding 
companies with over $10 billion in assets.123  The main difference between the CCAR 
and the Dodd-Frank stress tests is the capital action assumptions that are combined with 
pre-tax net income projections to estimate post-stress capital levels.124  The Dodd-Frank 
test uses a standard set of capital action assumptions that are laid out in the Dodd-Frank 
test rules, while the CCAR analysis uses the bank holding company’s planned capital 
actions to determine whether the company would meet supervisory expectations for 
capital minimums in stressful economic conditions.125 
For the institutions that had participated in SCAP, the results of the CCAR and 
Dodd-Frank stress tests were publicly disclosed in March 2013.126  The Federal Reserve 
approved the capital plans of fourteen of the financial institutions, conditionally approved 
the plans of two more, which must be resubmitted for approval later in 2013, and 
objected to the plans of the final two, which must be resubmitted after correcting any 
deficiencies.127  The remainder of the companies subject to stress testing under the Dodd-
Frank requirements were not required to conduct their first stress tests until the fall of 
2013 and will not have to publicly disclose results of that test.128 
                                                
 
123 Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Dodd-Frank Act Stress Test 2013: Supervisory Stress Test 
Methodology and Results nn.7–8 (2013), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/stress-
tests/dodd-frank-act-stress-testing.htm. 
124 Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., supra note 116, at 5. 
125 Id. 
126 See Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., supra note 123; Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve 
Sys., supra note 116, at 4. 
127 Press Release, Fed. Reserve Bd. (Mar. 14, 2013), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/20130314a.htm. 
128 Press Release, Fed. Reserve Bd., supra note 121. 
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 Despite the success of SCAP and the subsequent stress tests, there is still debate 
over the merits of publicly disclosing the stress test results of individual banks.  Some 
banks object because they fear that, in normal times when confidence in the banking 
system is not in jeopardy, public disclosure of the capital needs of individual banks may 
result in runs on weaker banks or in a competitive disadvantage that will prevent weaker 
banks from earning their way out of capital shortages.129  Commentators echo this fear as 
well, noting that market participants’ ex post reactions to stress test results may not be 
efficient.130  Participants may put more weight than is warranted on the public disclosure 
(in turn reducing the weight they place on their own valuable private information) 
because the disclosure provides information not only about the bank’s health but also 
about how other market participants may react, which in turn will influence how they 
react.131   
Our relative efficiency perspective, however, makes us skeptical of these 
arguments.  Frequent and repeated stress tests would inform the market of the capital 
deficiencies of banks in time to allow management to address the capital gap well short 
                                                
 
129 U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, supra note 113, at 42; see Itay Goldstein & Haresh Sapra, Should 
Banks’ Stress Test Results be Disclosed? An Analysis of the Costs and Benefits 2 (Apr. 2, 2012) 
(unpublished manuscript prepared for Committee on Capital Markets Regulation) (on file with author), 
available at http://finance.wharton.upenn.edu/~itayg/Files/stresstests.pdf; see also Tarullo, supra note 112, 
at 4. 
130 Goldstein & Sapra, supra note 129, at 27. 
131 Id. at 18. Goldstein and Sapra discuss two other negative effects that could come from increased 
disclosure (possible sub-optimal decisions of banks ex ante, and a reduction in traders’ incentives to gather 
information) but conclude that disclosure would be beneficial on the whole because it would promote 
financial stability.  Id. at 8, 24, 29.  Til Schuermann agrees that disclosure may disincentivize market 
participants from generating private information and trading on it, and thus proposes an intermediate 
disclosure solution.  Now that trust in the banking system has been somewhat regained, Schuermann 
proposes disclosing stress test results in the aggregate in order to provide the market with information while 
maintaining an incentive for market participants to gather information.  See Til Schuermann, Stress Testing 
Banks 19 (Feb. 13, 2013) (unpublished manuscript, available at 
http://fic.wharton.upenn.edu/fic/papers/12/12-08.pdf). 
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of the point at which it might initiate a bank run.  Such tests would also provide 
regulators with early warnings of conditions they could better address sooner rather than 
later.  In contrast, hiding capital weakness in the hope it will go away serves neither to 
discipline the bank managers who have placed their banks in that position,132 nor to force 
the attention of the regulators on the problem.  It also misleads the public, whose funds 
are deposited in these institutions and who may have invested in the institutions’ 
securities.  We think the lesson of a relative market efficiency assessment counsels 
powerfully in favour of continued transparency.133   
3.   A Bad Intervention: Relaxing Fair Value Reporting Standards 
 
 The Treasury Department’s and Federal Reserve Board’s stress tests had the 
explicit goal of providing to the market credible new public information concerning the 
financial condition of large United States banks.  In contrast, the FASB’s financial crisis-
motivated expansion of a bank’s discretion over the balance sheet values assigned to 
financial assets was the stress tests’ evil twin; it reduced the amount, credibility, and 
usefulness of accounting information available to the market.  The Treasury Department 
rejected the argument that public disclosure of the real capitalization of banks would 
worsen the financial crisis.  The FASB made a different choice.   
                                                
 
132 Indeed, it would operate in the opposite direction.  Allowing management of an undercapitalized bank 
more time to “earn” its way out of a capital deficit is to allow management (and shareholders) to increase 
the value of their out of the money option by lengthening its term.  The same analysis suggests that the time 
would be used to increase the riskiness of the bank’s assets. 
133 Financial commentators agree that rigorous and transparent stress testing was a critical aspect of the 
recovery of the banking system in the US after 2009.  Correlatively, there is widespread concern today that 
insufficiently rigorous and transparent testing will cost the EU banking system and broader economy dearly 
in 2014 and beyond.  See, e.g., Sam Fleming & Patrick Jenkins, US Stress Tests Set Standard for ECB 
Bank Health Tests, Fin. Times, Oct. 24, 2013, at p. 8 (stating that US stress tests of 2009 are “gold 
standard” and European Central Bank should “measure up to US precedent” despite opposition from banks 
and Member States or face serious economic consequences). 
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Understanding how the FASB relaxed the requirements of fair value accounting 
in April 2009 requires a brief description of the framework at that time for valuing assets 
under U.S. GAAP.134  For purposes of assessing the impact of accounting rules on 
financial institutions, the critical starting point is accounting for loans as set forth under 
FASB 115;135 in general, loans are the largest category of large U.S. financial institutions’ 
balance sheet assets.136  Under FASB 115, accounting for loans differs depending on 
whether the loans are held for sale or held for investment—that is, depending on the 
expectation that the loan will be held until maturity.  Loans held for sale, for example 
loans being warehoused before being securitized, are carried at fair value.  A loan held 
for investment is carried at the lower of fair value or amortized cost, with a write down to 
fair value required if the loan’s value drops below cost.  Loans held for investment are 
the most significant asset on U.S. banks’ balance sheets, representing fifty-eight percent 
of balance sheet assets at the end of the first quarter of 2008.137 
This brings us to Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (“SFAS”) 157, 
entitled “Fair Value Measurements.”138  SFAS 157 does not in itself require the 
application of fair value accounting to any class of assets.  Rather, it specifies the manner 
                                                
 
134 International Financial Accounting Standards approach these questions in a broadly similar way.  
Discussion of these standards is beyond the scope of our effort here. 
135 Financial Accounting Standards Board Standard 115, Accounting for Certain Investments in Debt or 
Equity Securities 5. FASB 115 is now codified as Accounting Standards Codification (ASC) 320. 
136 U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Report and Recommendations Pursuant to Section 133 of the Emergency 
Economic Stabilization Act of 2008: Study on Mark-To-Market Accounting 104 (2008), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2008/marktomarket123008.pdf; Christian Laux & Christian Leuz, Did 
Fair Value Accounting Contribute to the Financial Crisis?, 24 J. Econ. Persp. 93, 98 (2010) (“‘Loans and 
leases’ are by far the most important asset class for bank holding companies and generally account for half 
or more of these banks’ total assets.”) 
137 U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm’n, supra note 136, at 104, n.145. 
138 FASB, Accounting Standards Update, Fair Value Measurements (Topic 820) 162 (2011), available at 
http://www.fasb.org/cs/BlobServer?blobcol=urldata&blobtable=MungoBlobs&blobkey=id&blobwhere=11
75822486936&blobheader=application/pdf. 
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in which fair value is determined for assets, like loans held for sale rather than for 
investment (to maturity), that other accounting standards prescribe be carried at fair 
value.139    
SFAS 157 defines fair value as “the price that would be received to sell an asset 
or paid to transfer a liability in an orderly transaction between market participants at the 
measurement date.”140  So far, matters are clear enough.  When there are a large number 
of arm’s length transactions involving identical assets, determining fair value is 
mechanical.  But what happens when frequency of transactions and the value of subprime 
mortgages and related derivatives drop precipitously, as was the case with these 
instruments?  For purposes of financial statement presentation, the questions were: by 
how much did the value of these assets drop and how would the drop be shown on bank 
balance sheets?  Because of the freeze-up in the credit markets,141 the banks believed that 
the limited number of observable market transactions were at unrealistically low prices—
that is, that the fundamental values of these loans were higher than the price that could be 
obtained in the market under crisis conditions.  Did the loans have to be valued at the 
price for which they could be sold at the moment, or could banks exercise judgment in 
valuing the assets for balance sheet purposes? 
                                                
 
139 SFAS 157 is now codified as Accounting Standards Codification Topic 820, available at 
http://www.fasb.org/cs/BlobServer?blobcol=urldata&blobtable=MungoBlobs&blobkey=id&blobwhere=11
75822486936.  In May 2011, the IASB and FASB worked together to update Topic 820 through 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) 13.  The updated Topic 820, like SFAS 157, does not 
require the use of fair value accounting, but instead provides guidance on its application.  See FASB, News 
Release, IASB and FASB Issue Common Fair Value Measurement and Disclosure Requirements (May 12, 
2011), available at 
http://www.fasb.org/cs/ContentServer?pagename=FASB/FASBContent_C/NewsPage&cid=117615854494
4. 
140 FASB, supra note 139, at ¶ 5.  This definition remained consistent in Accounting Standards Update 
Topic 820, supra note 138, at 196. 
141 See supra note 97 and accompanying text. 
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Proponents of suspending or relaxing the application of SFAS 157 during the 
financial crisis typically identified bank regulation as the link between accounting 
valuation methods and real economic consequences.142  In this account, balance sheet 
values are the inputs into the bank supervisor’s calculation of capital adequacy.  A write-
down of loan (asset) values results in increased bank leverage.  To satisfy capital 
requirements, banks would then be forced to reduce leverage by selling loans or other 
assets at, in their view, artificially low prices.  In turn, increased sales into a barely 
functioning market would further reduce market prices, which would set off another 
round of sales as other banks marked their loans to the new market.  The problem was 
said to have systemic effects because asset sales by one bank would result in reduced 
asset values for other banks, causing a system-wide reduction in bank capital.  This 
reduction, in turn, would reduce the financial system’s capacity to make loans, thereby 
deepening the recession.  
The FASB responded to the political pressure by easing the application of SFAS 
157 in two ways.  First, it loosened the standards under FASB 115 that governed when an 
asset would be treated as held for investment, and therefore carried at historical cost 
rather than at fair value.  Second, its relaxation of SFAS 157 increased a company’s 
discretion to move assets into Level 3, where assets could be “marked-to-model” in the 
absence of reliable market price information.  The result was a considerable increase in 
                                                
 
142 See Laux & Leuz, supra note 136, at 95 (“The most commonly suggested and most plausible mechanism 
through which fair-value accounting could contribute to a financial crisis involves the link between 
accounting and bank capital regulation.”); Richard A. Epstein & M. Todd Henderson, Do Accounting 
Rules Matter?  The Dangerous Allure of Mark to Market, 36 J. Corp. L. 513, 513 (2011).  For theoretical 
models of how fair value accounting could affect real performance, see, for example, G.H. Plantin, H. 
Sapra & H.S. Shin, Marking-to-Market: Panacea or Pandora’s Box?, 46 J. Acct. Res. 435, 437 (2008). 
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the discretion of financial institutions to determinate the fair value of their balance-sheet 
assets.143 
Proponents of the changes argued that improving relative market efficiency by 
disclosure also came at a heavy cost: Decreasing financial institutions’ forward capital on 
the books results in contagion effects and increases the likelihood of a recession.  The 
Subprime Crisis demonstrates that increasing relative efficiency is just not worth the 
costs.  But three important weaknesses, two empirical and one analytical, undermine this 
argument. 
The first empirical point is straightforward—banks had too few loans actually 
subject to SFAS 157 to make any difference.144  A number of empirical studies strongly 
suggest that SFAS 157 had no impact on the Financial Crisis.  For example, at the close 
of the first quarter of 2008, the SEC 133 Study found that thirty-one percent of total bank 
assets were subject to fair value accounting under SFAS 157.145  However, virtually all of 
these assets (twenty-nine percent of total assets) were investment assets, trading assets, or 
derivatives.  Thus, the overwhelming percentage of loans, including especially subprime 
                                                
 
143 Laux & Leuz, supra note 136, at 109; FASB, Staff Position No. FAS 157-4, Determining Fair Value 
When the Volume and Level of Activity for the Asset or Liability Have Significantly Decreased and 
Identifying Transactions That Are Not Orderly 1 (Apr. 9, 2009), available at 
http://www.fasb.org/cs/ContentServer?pagename=FASB%2FDocument_C%2FDocumentPage&cid=11761
54545450. 
144 For example, Wallison argues that FASB 115 was too restrictive in allowing a company to treat a loan as 
held to maturity, with the result that it was subject to FASB 157.  Peter J. Wallison, Fair Value Accounting: 
A Critique, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research (July 2008) 2, available at 
http://www.aei.org/outlook/28389.  Shaffer notes, however, that as of the close of the first quarter of 2008, 
only a total of twelve percent of bank loans were classified as either held for sale or held for investments.  
S. Shaffer, Fair Value Accounting: Villain or Innocent Victim, (Fed. Reserve Bank of Bos. Quantitative 
Analysis Unit Working Paper, 2010) 12, available at 
http://www.bostonfed.org/bankinfo/qau/wp/2010/qau1001.htm; see also Mary E. Barth & Wayne R. 
Landsman, How did Financial Reporting Contribute to the Financial Crisis? 19 Eur. Accounting Rev. 399, 
405–07 (2010). 
145 U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm’n, supra note 136, at 47. 
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loans, were carried at historical cost, and were not subject to fair value adjustment unless 
they became impaired.  Financial institutions may have sold assets during the credit 
crisis, but fair value accounting did not cause their sale, and therefore did not cause 
contagion.  
The second empirical problem is that the evidence suggests that companies will 
take advantage of discretion over balance sheet values to overstate the carrying value of 
assets.  Laux and Leuz report two examples of circumstances in which banks appear to 
have exercised discretion to overstate asset values when accounting standards permitted 
them to do so.  The first example was the reluctance of banks to write down the goodwill 
created by past acquisitions of other banks.  “[O]f the 50 U.S. banks that made substantial 
acquisitions prior to the financial crisis, 35 banks have not written down their goodwill 
positions at all, despite the fact that banks’ market values have declined precipitously in 
the crisis.”146  The second example involves banks’ estimates of losses for loans that, 
because they were expected to be held to maturity, were carried on the balance sheet at 
historical cost.  SFAS 107 nonetheless requires that the fair value of these loans be 
disclosed in the footnotes.  Laux and Luez find that the difference between the loans’ 
amortized cost and fair value was very much larger than the loss reserves established by 
                                                
 
146 Laux & Leuz, supra note 136, at 111.  For example, the authors report a study showing that Bank of 
America carried on its balance sheet $80 billion in goodwill, amounting to more than fifty percent of its 
equity, largely as a result of bank acquisitions such as Fleet Boston, MBNA and LaSalle Bank between 
2004 and 2007.  As late as the second quarter of 2009, Bank of America had not recorded any reduction in 
the value of goodwill despite the requirement that the value of goodwill created by an acquisition be 
assessed every year.   
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the banks.147  Huizenga and Levin, too, find that banks overstated the value of real estate 
loans during the crisis since they were held on the balance sheet at cost.148 
The analytic problem with the argument against fair value accounting is equally 
compelling.  It is this: Fair value analysis identifies bank supervisory capital requirements 
as the link between accounting disclosure and the asset sales that are said to trigger a 
cascade of capital reductions, additional asset sales, and reductions in lending.  As 
accounting scholars have stressed, however, this syllogism is incorrect, both normatively 
and positively.  As a normative matter, capital requirements are set by agencies for the 
purpose of bank regulation, not for use by investors.149  As the SEC stated in its recent 
study, “[f]inancial reporting is intended to meet the needs of investors.  While financial 
reporting may serve as a starting point for other users, such as prudential regulators, the 
Staff recommends that U.S. GAAP should continue to be developed to satisfy the needs 
of investors.”150  Like public stress tests, accounting standards that increase relative 
efficiency illuminate financial circumstances that financial regulators should address.  
Additionally, observability serves to allocate political responsibility.  Investor-focused 
accounting standards that reveal capital deficits also force financial regulators to take 
political responsibility for extending regulatory forbearance rather than burying the 
problem under opaque accounting standards such as historical cost.  Thus, separating 
accounting standards from regulatory standards makes financial regulators politically 
                                                
 
147 Laux & Leuz, supra note 136, at 114. 
148 Harry Huizinga & Luc Laeven, Bank Valuation and Accounting Discretion During a Financial Crisis, 
106 J. Fin. Econ. 614, 615, 621 (2012). 
149 Id. at 615; Barth & Landsman, supra note 144, at 407 (“[I]t is the responsibility of bank regulators, not 
accounting standard setters, to determine how best to mitigate the effects of procyclicality on the stability 
of the banking system.”). 
150 U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm’n, supra note 136, at 206. 
 
 
70 
 
accountable for their decisions. 
In short, the FASB’s relaxation of fair value accounting rules in response to 
political pressure gets it backward.  Accounting standards should increase relative 
informational efficiency, which calls for strengthening, not relaxing, the disclosure of 
market valuations.  As accounting scholars Barth and Landsman conclude, “transparency 
of information associated with measurement and recognition of accounting amounts 
relating to, and disclosure of information about, asset securitizations and derivatives 
likely were insufficient for investors to assess properly the values and riskiness of 
affected bank assets and liabilities.”151  Matters of prudential regulation, including 
especially regulatory decisions that relax capital requirements in the cause of 
macroeconomic goals, should be transparent and subject to political accountability. 
B.  Market Structure and Price Efficiency  
If lower information costs are one pillar of efficient asset prices, smoothly 
functioning trading markets are the other.  As Part III indicated above, overlaying a 
primary market on an actively traded secondary market may, by accident or design, 
dissipate the value of the information already aggregated by the underlying secondary 
market.  This was one structural problem to arise in the Subprime Crisis.  The second 
problem of market structure was pervasive reliance on OTC or bilateral markets and 
bespoke assets, both of which hampered the aggregation and distribution of market-wide 
price and volume information.  When viewed from an ECMH perspective, both of these 
problems suggest more or less obvious solutions.  Again, the key questions are whether 
the suggested solutions are cost effective and whether they require regulatory 
                                                
 
151 Barth & Landsman, supra note 144, at 401. 
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intervention.   
1. Trading in Proxy Instruments  
 Commentators on the Subprime Crisis generally agree that the introduction of 
mortgage-backed securities markets hastened the eventual collapse of the housing 
bubble.152  As described in Part III, two derivative products facilitated hedging and 
shorting mortgage-backed securities.  In chronological order, the first was CDS 
protection, which entered the RMBS market in tradable form in mid-2005.153  (By 
contrast, CDS protection written on specific CDOs was a one-off deal invisible to the 
larger market.)  The second shorting and hedging instrument encompassed the ABX 
subprime indices that began to trade on an open exchange in January 2006.  Following 
Geanakoplos and Gorton, we believe that that trading in these derivatives made a large 
difference.  Something had to pop the bubble, and it was already too late for a soft 
landing by the time that these derivative markets had emerged.      
Although Geanakoplos and Gorton see the auxiliary markets as accelerating the 
end of the bubble in different ways, both stress their importance in impounding new 
information into RMBS prices.  For Geanakoplos, financial institutions such as AIG, 
Lehman Brothers, Goldman Sachs, and other investment banks turned the switch by 
aggressively selling CDS protection on RMBS in 2005154 and bespoke protection on 
CDOs shortly thereafter.  The customers for these derivatives were hedge funds, 
                                                
 
152 See, e.g., Gorton, supra note 57, at 10; Ferrell and Saha, supra note 80, at 98; Geanakoplos supra note 
46, at 110.  
153 Geanakoplos, supra note 46, at 113; see also Ana Fostel & John Geanakoplos, Tranching, CDS, and 
Asset Prices: How Financial Innovation Can Cause Bubbles and Crashes, 4 Am. Econ. J.: Macroeconomics 
190, 191–93 (2012). 
154 Geanakoplos, supra note 46, at 113–14, speaks of standardized CDSs, but it is uncertain when true 
standardized CDS’s first became a force in the mortgage bond market.  It may not have been before the 
appearance of index-based CDSs in 2008.     
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arbitrageurs, and even issuers of CDOs themselves who sought to hedge exposure to the 
inventories of mortgage-backed securities still on their shelves.  According to 
Geanakoplos, “[b]y buying [CDS protection], the pessimists for the first time could 
leverage their negative views about bond prices and . . . actively push bond prices 
down.”155  In Geanakoplos’s view, the full force of CDS protection emerged only as the 
numbers of contracts grew and market sentiment slowly shifted, first against RMBS 
optimists and later against structured mortgage-backed bonds generally.  In this story, the 
good news is that the bubble burst sooner than it would have otherwise.  The bad news 
was that the bursting bubble devastated the sellers of CDS protection such as AIG and 
Lehman Brothers.  Nevertheless, “[h]ad the CDS market for [RBMS] been around from 
the beginning, asset prices might never have gotten so high [in the first place].”156  
As we suggested in Part III, we favor Gary Gorton’s emphasis on information 
aggregation in the ABX market as the most powerful factor channeling information about 
deteriorating housing prices into subprime RMBS bonds, and—inevitably after a lag—
eroding demand for AAA bonds collateralized by CDOs that were heavily invested in 
lower-tranche RMBS bonds.  But regardless of the relative importance of these 
mechanisms, the point is that innovative securities eventually gave birth to derivatives 
that forced them to face up to bad news as well as good news.  The typical lags in 
securities development—the introduction of the security first and the shorting vehicle six 
                                                
 
155 Id. at 111 (emphasis added); accord Luigi Zingales, Credit Default Swaps on Trial, Project Syndicate 2 
(Apr. 19, 2010), available at http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/credit-default-swaps-on-trial; 
see also Fostel & Geanakoplos, supra note 153, at 194, 212–14.  Wallace, supra note 49, at 34-35, argues 
that because of the demand for insurance, the drop in prices caused the instruments to trade at levels that 
overstated the default risk on the underlying mortgages. 
156 Geanakoplos, supra note 46, at 113; see also Fostel & Geanakoplos, supra note 153, at 216–17. 
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months later—suggests that regulator might intervene proactively to balance the 
reflection of information into the prices of innovative securities when market makers 
seem sluggish to act on their own.  Regulators might scrutinize rapidly expanding 
markets in innovative securities—for example, the market in securitized mortgage-
backed securities—with a practical sense that not all components of an efficient market 
inevitably fall into place at once.  Here, regulators can borrow from the playbook of 
market makers such as Markit, the developer of the ABX index, by encouraging auxiliary 
markets in which proxies can be traded and market-wide information revealed.  Chances 
are that market makers will not need much encouragement to police the relative price 
efficiency in fast-growing trading markets.  Perhaps regulatory encouragement and 
favorable publicity are all that is needed. 
An innovative but opaque primary market, however, seems like a different 
animal.  Here there is little or no information aggregation through trading.  As a thought 
experiment, consider what might have occurred if underwriters of mortgage-backed 
CDOs had been required to meet minimal standardization requirements in 2005 and a 
private market platform (such as Markit) had been invited to initiate trading in indices 
that referenced individual tranches of the 20 largest CDOs issued in a given period.  One 
suspects that the sophisticated traders in the RMBS market would soon have turned to 
shorting the AAA tranches of subprime mezzanine CDOs.  In turn, the falling prices of 
the CDO indices might have raised a red flag large enough to stir anxiety among even the 
most staid institutional purchasers of these supposedly minimal-risk, fixed-return bonds.  
And maybe, just maybe, the information would have caused the regulators to notice the 
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growing importance of the shadow banks.157  If the handwriting was not yet on the wall, 
the falling prices of AAA CDO bond indices might have written it there, perhaps a full 
six months before the last AAA bonds were placed prior to the worst of the actual 
Subprime Crisis.        
 2. Redesigning Market Structure 
 Engineering unconventional auxiliary markets raises questions of need and 
feasibility; reengineering existing markets to better inform regulators raises even more 
difficult questions of policy and political economy.  Academics and policy makers have 
intensely debated the wisdom of the Dodd-Frank Act’s mandate to standardize 
derivatives (such as CDS contracts) and shift their trading from traditional OTC markets 
to clearing house markets (termed the “central clearing counterparties” or “CCPs” in the 
literature).158  In a CCP market, the CCP itself is the counterparty to both buyers and 
sellers.159  We do not address here the technical aspects of such markets, or their effects 
on containing counterparty trading risk, which loom large in the policy debate.  
                                                
 
157 See Gorton, supra note 56, at 157 (stressing the role of shadow banking in the transformation of the 
Subprime Crisis into the Financial Crisis and the role played by the regulators’ lack of information about 
the shadow banks). 
158 See, e.g., John Hull, CCPs: Their Risks, and How They Can Be Reduced, 20 J. Derivatives 26, 26 
(2012).  For a discussion on how CCPs should be regulated to avoid excessive systemic risk, see Darrell 
Duffie, Replumbing Our Financial System: Uneven Progress, 9 Int’l J. Central Banking 251, 253, 266–73 
(2013), available at http://www.ijcb.org/journal/ijcb13q0a12.pdf.  For concerns about central 
clearinghouses failing and becoming the next government-sponsored enterprises, see Viral V. Acharya et 
al., Regulating Wall Street: The Dodd-Frank Act and the New Architecture of Global Finance 378–79 
(2011).  For an argument on central clearing’s ability to lower the financial system’s cost of providing 
derivatives to hedge risks, see Hit or Miss: Regulating Derivative Markets to Reduce Hedging Costs at 
Non-­‐Financial Companies: Hearing on “Challenges Facing the U.S. Capital Markets to Effectively 
Implement Title VII of the Dodd-­‐Frank Act” Before the Subcomm. on Capital Mkts. and Gov’t Sponsored 
Enter. of the Comm. on Fin. Serv., 113th Cong. 2 (2012) (statement of John E. Parsons), available at 
http://dspace.mit.edu/bitstream/handle/1721.1/76235/2013-002.pdf. 
159 See, e.g., Darrell Duffie & Haoxiang Zhu, Does a Central Clearing Counterparty Reduce Counterparty 
Risk?, 1 Rev. Asset Pricing Stud. 74, 74 ( 2011), available at 
http://raps.oxfordjournals.org/content/1/1/74.full.pdf 
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Following our focus on the ECMH, our concern here is with the relative informational 
advantages of OTC and the CCP market structures.  
One informational advantage claimed for the CCP model does involve counter-
party risk, however.  A CCP market structure would prevent regulatory surprises such as 
the horrific discovery that AIG was rapidly facing insolvency as a result of extending 
CDS protection to a large fraction of the mortgage-backed bond industry.  A CCP 
structure, in other words, would have alerted regulators and the mutual owners of the 
CCPs themselves to rapid expansions and concentrations of purchases and sales of CDS 
protection.160  In addition, a CCP structure would create a second important informational 
benefit by providing market transparency and automatically generating low-cost 
information about aggregate market prices and trading volume.161  This, it is argued, 
would markedly increase the informational efficiency of the derivative markets.   
Curiously, however, the need for information to ensure rational pricing and avoid 
moral hazard is also the most plausible information-based argument against the CCP 
model.162  CCP critics argue that shifting the risk for counterparty losses from individual 
traders to the CCP as a whole would diminish trader incentives to investigate the 
solvency of their counterparties.  This would subject a CCP market to both moral hazard 
and potential adverse selection problems.  The only way the CCP could counter these 
problems would be to increase collateral requirements and tighten the rules screening out 
                                                
 
160 Darrell Duffie, Ada Li & Teo Lubke, Policy Perspectives on the OTC Derivatives Market Infrastructure, 
Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Staff Report No. 424, at 17 (Jan. 2010). 
161 Id. at 17. 
162 E.g., Craig Pirrong, The Inefficiency of Clearing Mandates, CATO Institute Policy Analysis 3–4 (July 
11, 2010), available at http://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/PA665.pdf; Alistair Milne, OTC 
Central Counterparty Clearing: Myths and Reality, 5 J. Risk Mgmt. in Fin. Inst. 335, 339–40 (2012). 
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classes of potential counterparties.  These protective measures, it is argued, would raise 
CCP transactions costs well above the purported informational benefits of the CCP 
regime.  In addition, a collective failure to gather sufficient information about 
counterparties would deprive traders of the information necessary to make the most 
economical allocations of counterparty risks.  Hence trades would be less accurately—
and hence less efficiently—priced.163  Regulators would sacrifice existing OTC markets 
in a misguided attempt to reduce systemic risk and generate aggregate market 
information.   
Although this is a very crude account of the actual policy debate, it suffices to 
make the point that various dimensions of information costs are as important to 
evaluating single-level market reforms as they are to addressing information cost issues 
in multi-layered markets.   
V. Conclusion 
This Article assesses the prominent post-Crisis claim that the mispricing in the 
securities markets related to the Sub-Prime Crisis demonstrates, once and for all, the 
bankruptcy of the Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis itself.  We argue here, as we have 
previously, that the EMCH efficiency is best understood as a theory about relative 
efficiency with which public information is reflected in market prices.  In the perfect 
market of finance theory, all information is instantly reflected in prices that are 
fundamentally as well as informationally efficient.  In real capital markets with active 
secondary trading, prices generally reflect public information rapidly—albeit not 
                                                
 
163 Pirrong, supra note 162, at 10–11; see also Craig Pirrong, The Economics of Central Clearing: Theory 
and Practice, ISDA Discussion Paper Series 13–14 (May 2011), available at 
http://www2.isda.org/attachment/MzE0NA==/ISDAdiscussion_CCP_Pirrong.pdf. 
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instantaneously.  Information that is “private” or costly to acquire enters price more 
slowly and sometimes not at all.  Similarly, prices in markets without an effective 
arbitrage mechanism incorporate public information very slowly.  These include primary 
markets, markets for informationally insensitive securities, and markets dominated by 
noise traders.   
During the Sub-Prime Crisis, multiple institutional frictions impeded relative 
efficiency to varying degrees in the markets most closely associated with mortgage-
backed securities.  First, the critical information was extremely costly to acquire: the 
evidence strongly indicates that few investors had real knowledge in 2005 and early 2006 
that housing prices would collapse during 2007.  If the existence of a real estate bubble 
was widely recognized, the timing of its collapse was not.  And even if the timing of a 
drop in housing prices had been known with some certainty, assessing the implications 
for default risks and prices in the associated securities markets was costly information to 
acquire, particularly in the case of the CDS and stock markets.  The implications of 
declining housing prices for publicly-traded shares of financial institutions depended in 
large part on the effect of declining prices on the value of AAA CDO tranches.  For a 
variety of reasons--ranging from inherent complexity and idiosyncratic terms to a 
misplaced trust in rating agencies and the absence of secondary trading—prices in the 
senior CDO “market” were uniquely inefficient, just as the ECMH would have led us to 
expect them to be.  Only prices of RMBS reacted with a modicum of efficiency to early 
signs of weakness in the housing market and, even here, they became informationally 
sensitive largely as the result of a market innovation: the introduction of trading in the 
ABX.HE indices, which revealed new information by greatly improving the efficiency of 
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hedging and arbitrage in the RMBS market.  The market, in turn, became pessimistic in 
early 2007 and began to panic soon thereafter.  The early tremors in the RMBS market 
collateralized by subprime and alt-prime mortgages eventually triggered tidal waves in 
the primary markets for CDOs and in the secondary stock market for large financial 
institutions, but only during last quarter of 2007.  
In our view, this chain of developments vindicates a modest form of the ECMH 
that incorporates market frictions and focuses principally on informational efficiency.  It 
can be read to “refute” only an overblown framing of market efficiency, which makes the 
claim that market prices are fundamentally efficient in the sense of more or less 
accurately reflecting the discounted present value of the cashflows associated market 
securities.  This quasi-empirical (and thoroughly immodest) claim was the intellectual 
basis for advancing a broad agenda of deregulation in the capital markets.  But it never 
quite made sense, not merely because it could not be tested directly but more importantly 
because it failed to acknowledge the range of market frictions that impede informational 
efficiency, which is itself a necessary condition for any degree of fundamental efficiency 
in market prices.  Unfortunately, however, misframing the ECMH as a strong and direct 
claim about the fundamental efficiency of market prices without regard to market 
frictions or informational efficiency has presented an easy target for the critics of market 
efficiency.  This criticism, which builds upon the Subprime Crisis and other recent 
market shocks, threatens to remove all analysis of the efficiency of market prices from 
the regulatory agenda.  Our concern is that the limited but genuinely helpful insights of a 
more modest ECMH will be lost in the general condemnation of animal spirits and noise 
traders.  
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A properly-framed ECMH focuses our attention on the frictions that drive a 
wedge between relative efficiency and efficiency under perfect market conditions. So 
framed, relative efficiency is a diagnostic tool that identifies the frictions and information 
costs that reduce price efficiency.  Relative efficiency thus provides part of a regulatory 
strategy to address the problems raised by the Crisis.  It will not prevent future bubbles 
and crises, but improving the performance of the mechanisms of market efficiency will 
make prices more efficient, frictions more transparent, and public sector agency costs 
more observable, which may in turn allow us to catch the next problem earlier.  This 
would be no small accomplishment.  Recall that as late as September 8, 2008, the 
Congressional Budget Office was still uncertain whether a “period of slow growth 
[resulting from the housing bubble] will ultimately be designated a recession,” and was 
predicting 1.1 percent growth in 2009.164  Eight days later, Lehman Brothers had failed, 
and AIG was being nationalized.  While perfect markets would be even better, a strategy 
of improving the relative informational efficiency of the markets is itself a substantial 
improvement in a friction-filled world and a prerequisite for fundamentally rational 
market prices. 
 
                                                
 
164 Cong. Budget Office, The Budget and Economic Outlook: An Update 23 (2008), available at 
http://www.cbo.gov/publication/41729. 
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